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JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-4-103(j).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

The Eskelsens present five issues for appeal. (Br. 5-6.) We have a slightly
different take on the standards of review. 1
1.

On the first issue-imputing knowledge under agency principles-whether

to impute knowledge is a question of law reviewed for correctness, see Insight Assets,
Inc. v. Farias, 2013 UT 47, ,r 13, 321 P.3d 1021, but whether there is knowledge to

impute and that knowledge is poses a question of fact reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard, see id.; In re Adoption ofBaby B., 2012 UT 35, ,r 45, 308 P.3d 382
(explaining that "knowledge is a 'subjective ... state of mind,' which normally is a fact
question.") (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994)).
2.

The second issue, whether Theta had notice, is a question of fact reviewed

under the clearly erroneous standard. See Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)(4) ("Findings of fact,
whether based on oral or other evidence, must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and the reviewing court must give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the
credibility of the witnesses."); 4447 Assocs. v. First Sec. Fin., 889 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995) ("A determination concerning whether a party had notice or knowledge of
Gt

a particular transaction or occurrence is a finding of fact and 'will not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous."') (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)).

~

1

We also take them in a different and more logical order in this brief.

I
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3.

The third issue fuses together two separate issues. First, whether the

Eskelsens properly removed Hansen as VC Holdings' manager. This presents a mixed
question: the application of law (required procedures for removal) to a given set of facts
(the Eskelsens' actions as found by the trial court). See State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ,r,r
21-22, 144 P.3d 1096. Because the legal requirements are plainly defined by statute and
contract (the operating agreement), little deference is given to the trial court's ultimate
legal conclusions. See id. ,r,r 22-24.
The next issue, whether Hansen's actions as manager are binding on VC Holdings,
is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard because the question depends entirely on
the trial court's determination of whether Theta had notice or knowledge of any
restrictions on that authority which is a fact question fact question. See Utah R. Civ. P.
52(a)(4); 4447 Assocs. v. First Sec. Fin., 889 P.2d at 471; In re Adoption of Baby B.,
2012 UT 35, ,r 45.
4.

The Eskelsens' fraudulent transfer claim hinges on whether they

established fraudulent intent. That is a fact question, reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard. See Lakeside Lumber Prod., Inc. v. Evans, 2005 UT App 87, ,r 9,
110 P.3d 154; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)(4).
5.

Finally, as explained below (Point V), this Court should review the trial

court's denial of the Rule 52(b) motion to amend for abuse of discretion.

2
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4i

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Central to the outcome of this appeal are the Utah Revised Limited Liability
Company Act (repealed 2013) and the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act, the relevant
portions of which are reproduced at Addendum D.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Statement of Facts, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below.
Because the Eskelsens have not challenged the trial court's lengthy findings of

@

fact, the Court should accept those findings as true on appeal, and we cite them
accordingly. See Holladay v. Storey, 2013 UT App 158, ,r 15,307 P.3d 584. 2
ii)

A.

JENCO and VC Holdings purchase the Property and form JVC.

In August 2007, the entities JENCO LC and VC Holdings LLC teamed up to
purchase some real property in Washington County, Utah described as "Proposed Lot
158 Fort Pierce Industrial Park" (the "Property"), with JENCO holding a 66.71 % interest
and VC Holdings' a 33.29% interest. (R. 1103 ,r 7; Ex 14.)
JENCO is a Utah limited liability company. (R. 1102 ,r 1.) Gilbert Jennings is
JENCO's manager. (R. 1102 ,r 1.) VC Holdings is likewise a Utah limited liability
company. (R. 1102 ,r 2.) Vaughn and Carolyn Hansen formed VC Holdings in 2005 by

2

The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are contained in the
record at R. 1101-1128 and attached to this brief at Addendum A. The trial court made
minor clerical corrections to those findings at R. 1242-1243, is also included at
Addendum A. We cite to the findings directly by reference to both record and paragraph
number. References to "Ex. " are to the trial exhibits.

3
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filing articles of organization with the Utah Department of Commerce, Division of
Corporations and Commercial Code (the "Division"). (R. 1102 ,r 2; Ex. 26.) 3
VC Holdings was established as a manager-managed company. (R. 1102 ,r 2; Exs.
26, 40- Operating Agreement, attached at Addendum B.) The Hansens were its only
members. (Ex. 40 - Operating Agreement § 3 .1.) It adopted an operating agreement to
govern its affairs, which was later amended to name both of the Hansens as its managers.

(R. 1102 ,r,r 2- 3; Ex. 52.) Shortly after purchasing its interest in the Property, VC
Holdings updated the records on file with the Division to name Vaughn Hansen as
manager. (R. 1102 ,r 4; Ex. 38.)
VC Holdings and JENCO later agreed to form a new entity to which they would
transfer their interests in the Property and take back ownership interests in the entity
commensurate with their Property interests. (R. 1103 ,r,r 7-10.) To that end, they formed

NC LC ("NC"). (R. 1103 ,r 8.) Jennings was appointed as NC's manager. (R. 1103 ,r
8.) Thereafter, in June 2008, VC Holdings and JENCO together transferred 100% of the
Property to NC. (R. 1103 ,r 9; Ex. 15.) In return, JENCO received a 68.2% interest in

NC and VC Holdings received a 31.8% interest. (R. 1103 ,r 1O; Ex. 25 at p.24.)
B.

The Eskelsens loan money to the Hansens.

Nearly a year after that transfer, in May 2009, Plaintiffs Chad and Loma Eskelsen
loaned the Hansens $120,000 for which the Hansens signed a promissory note. (R. 1103

,r 11; Ex. 1.)

As security for the loan, the Hansens signed an agreement pledging 100%

3

We refer to Vaughn Hansen as "Hansen," and to Vaughn and Carolyn collectively as
the "Hansens." Any references to Carolyn individually are so designated.
4
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of their membership interests in VC Holdings. (R. 1103 ,r 12; Ex. 2.) VC Holdings was
not a party to the promissory note. (R. 1103 ,r 13.)
Less than a year later, the Hansens defaulted on the note and the Eskelsens hired
attorney Daniel J. Tobler to collect. (R. 1103114.) The Eskelsens also filed a UCC-1
statement showing the Eskelsens as secured parties to 100% of the membership interest
in VC Holdings. (R. 1103-041115-16.) As part of his collection efforts, Tobler sent out
two letters, both dated December 27, 2010. (R. 11041117-18, 23.)
He sent the first letter to the Hansens. (R. 1104 11 17-18; Ex. 17.) This letter
stated that the Eskelsens were accepting-foreclosing-the Hansens' membership
interests in VC Holdings in "full satisfaction" of the promissory note. (R. 1104 ,r,r 17-18;
Ex. 17, attached at Addendum C.) This letter also stated that the Eskelsens were
removing the Hansens as managers of VC Holdings. (R. 1104119.) The letter
concluded by giving the Hansens 20 days to object to the Eskelsens' "proposal." (R.
1104120; Ex. 17.)
Tobler sent the second letter to NC in care of Jennings. (R. 1104123; Ex. 18.)
This letter proclaimed that the "Eskelsens have elected to be admitted as members of VC
~

Holdings, and are now managers of the same." (R. 1105124; Ex. 18.) It demanded that
all payments and distributions for VC Holdings' interest in NC be paid directly to the
Eskelsens. (Id.) It did not include a copy of Tobler's correspondence to the Hansens, nor
did it include any of the Eskelsen/Hansen loan documents. (R. 1105125; Ex. 18.) At
the time Tobler sent this letter to JVC, Jennings knew nothing about the Eskelsens or
their dealings with the Hansens. (R. 1105127.)
5
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. C.

An attorney attempts to help out a friend; Jennings investigates the
Eskelsens' claims.

On January 7, 2011, Tobler received a phone call from attorney Troy Blanchard.
(R. 1105 ,r 28.) Blanchard said he was calling as a favor to the Hansens, but that his firm
represented Jennings. (R. 1105 ,r 28.) Blanchard told Tobler that he did not believe the
Eskelsens had properly foreclosed the Hansens' membership interests in VC Holdings.
(R. 1105 ,r 28.) But instead of contesting the issue, Blanchard suggested a compromise to
allow the Hansens to broker a sale of VC Holdings' interests to Jennings, place the
proceeds in escrow, and the Hansens and Eskelsens could determine how to distribute
these proceeds between them. (R. 1105 ,r 28; 856 Trial Tr. 183:17-21.) At trial, Tobler
admitted that Blanchard "disputed" the propriety of the Eskelsens' foreclosure. (R. 72627 Trial Tr. 53:6-25, 54:1-13.) He also testified that he did not discuss with Blanchard

~

that the Eskelsens would have to sign for VC Holdings as part of the agreement
Blanchard was proposing. (R. 726-27 Trial Tr. 53:6-25, 54:1-13.) Tobler agreed to
consult with the Eskelsens and get back to Blanchard. (R. 1105 ,r 28.)
After his discussion with Blanchard, Tobler received a letter (dated January 4,
2011) directly from Jennings on behalf of NC responding to Tobler's December 27
letter. (R. 1106 ,r 30; Ex. 20.) In that letter, Jennings requested "documentary proof of
the transition of ownership" of VC Holdings. (R. 1106 ,r 30; Ex. 20.) Jennings also
informed Tobler that VC Holdings was "indebted to [NC] in the amount of $54,270.50,"
and suggested that the Eskelsens "contact me and work out a repayment plan." (R. 1106

,r 30; Ex. 20.)

6
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(i)

Jennings' investigation did not stop there. (R. 1107,r,r 37-39.) He also confronted
Hansen. (R. 1107,r 37.) Hansen confirmed to Jennings that he (Hansen) still owned VC
Holdings. (R. 1107 ,r 3 7.) Though there was conflicting evidence at trial on this point,
the trial court specifically found that Hansen made that representation to Jennings. (R.
1107,I 38.) Moreover, Jennings took the additional step of searching the Division's
online records and found that Hansen was still listed as VC Holdings' manager. (R. 1107

,r 39.)
At trial, Tobler testified that after his phone call with Blanchard he believed he
had made official contact with both Jennings' law firm and "unofficially" with the
Hansens' attorney and that it would not be ethical for him to contact either the Hansens or
Jennings. (R. 1106 ,r 34.) But Tobler never gave Blanchard the December 27
"foreclosure letter" or the signed agreements between the Hansens and Eskelsens. (R.
1106 ,r 31.) Nor did Tobler discuss Jennings' request for documents with Blanchard. (R.
1106 ,r 32.) In fact, Tobler never responded to Jennings' request for documents or
provide to either Blanchard or Jennings the "documentary proof' Jennings requested. (R.
1106 ,r 33, 1107,r 36.) Moreover, Tobler could not provide a direct answer at trial as to
whether he ever specifically claimed to Blanchard that Hansen did not have authority to
act as manager of VC Holdings. (R. 726 Trial Tr. 53:6-14.) In response to that question,
he explained, "Well, that was just kind of the general conversation that we had was that
the Eskelsens being involved in an agreement to allow Vaughn, and so-like I say, I
know that he [Blanchard] disputed whether or not we had taken it, but I didn't think that

7
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we would even be part of the conversation. He didn't agree we had some - some stake in
the matter." (R. 726 Trial Tr. 53:6-14.)
On January 19, Tobler contacted Blanchard to inform him that the Eskelsens
would agree to the proposed escrow agreement. (R. 1107,r 41.) Over a month later, on
February 22, Blanchard emailed Tobler that he had not yet had a chance to draft the
escrow agreement and that he would contact "the Jennings to confirm they will agree to
the escrow of funds to the extent of any distribution pursuant to the escrow agreement."

(R. 1108 ,r 42.) Blanchard's statement about contacting Jennings meant that he would
talk to Chris Engstrom, an attorney in Blanchard's law firm who primarily worked with
Jennings. (R. 1106-07,r 35, 1108 ,r 42.)
Blanchard had a single conversation with Engstrom in which he asked if Engstrom
thought Jennings would have an issue with an escrow agreement that would assist the
Hansens/Eskelsens resolve their debt. (R. 857-858 Trial Tr. 184:21-25, 185:1-2.)
Engstrom's response, according to Blanchard, was that "he didn't see why [Jennings]
would care." (Id.) Based on his conversation with Engstrom, Blanchard concluded that
Jennings would not have a problem with a proposed escrow agreement. (R. 1108 ,r 44.)
However, approximately one month later, on March 22, Blanchard emailed Tobler that
Hansen wanted to work directly with the Eskelsens and that he (Blanchard) would not be
preparing an agreement. (R. 1108 ,r,r 45-47.) When he emailed Tobler, Blanchard was
not aware of any discussions between the Hansens and Jennings to sell the Property
interest. (R. 1109 ,r 48.)

8
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~

D.

VC Holdings sells its interest in the Property to Theta.

Because of their financial difficulties, the Hansens had begun shopping around VC
Holdings' interest in the Property. (R. 1109 ,r 49.) Hansen claimed that he received an
offer sometime in 2010 but it never materialized. (R. 1109 ,r 50.) He also approached
Jennings and offered to sell the interest in NC. (R. 1109 ,r 52.) Because of the state of
the economy at that time, Jennings was not interested in the proposal but decided to
consider the offer to help the Hansens out. (R. 1109 ,r 53.)
Ultimately, some three months after Jennings received Tobler's December 27,
2010 letter, having heard nothing more about it, and having "exhausted everything" he
could do to discover if the Eskelsens had a valid claim, Jennings and the Hansens agreed
to the sale of VC Holdings' ownership interest in NC to a Jennings' affiliated company
known as Theta Investment Company {"Theta") for a purchase price of $236,337. (R.
1110 ,r,r 55-56.)
There was conflicting testimony at trial as between Hansen and Jennings
concerning Hansen's authority to conduct business for VC Holdings. (R. 1110-1112

,r,r 57-66.)

Hansen testified that, prior to the sale, he asked Jennings if he (Hansen) had

authority to conduct business on behalf of VC Holdings, and that Jennings responded that
the Eskelsens' claim was not valid. (R. 1110 ,r 57.) Hansen claimed that he would not
have participated in the transaction if Jennings had told him it was not legal. (R. 1110

,r 57.)

But Jennings testified to the opposite: that it was Hansen who told Jennings that

the Eskelsens did not have a valid claim. (R. 1110 ,r 58.)

9
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The trial court entered specific findings that Hansen's testimony was not credible,
and that it believed that the conversations went as Jennings described them. (R. 11111112 ,r,r 59-65.) The trial court found that "[i]t was Mr. Hansen who approached Mr.
Jennings and offered to sell the Property." (R. 1111

,r 62.)

And that Jennings "had no

reason to give Mr. Hansen legal or business advice regarding the sale of the property.
Mr. Hansen was the party pushing the sale, not Mr. Jennings, and it makes sense that Mr.
Hansen would be giving Mr. Jennings assurances that he was the manager ofVC
Holdings and could act on behalf of VC Holdings." (R. 1111-1112 ,r 65.) The trial court
found that "but for Mr. Hansen's assurances to Mr. Jennings that he could act on behalf
of VC Holdings," Jennings' company-Theta-"would probably not have purchased the
Property from VC Holdings in March of 2011." (R. 1112 ,r 66.)

E.

The closing on VC Holdings' sale to Theta.

On March 23, 2011, Engstrom ordered closing documents from Southern Utah
Title Company to handle the transaction for JVC Holdings to distribute a 31.8% interest
in the Property to VC Holdings, which in tum would sell it to Theta through a I 031
exchange qualified intermediary. (R. 1112 ,r 67; Ex. 5.) Six days later, on March 29,
Hansen, acting as manager ofVC Holdings, signed a purchase agreement to sell the
Property to Theta for $236,337. (R. 1112 ,r 68; Ex. 10.) At trial, Hansen testified there
was no appraisal of the property interest at the time of sale, but that he believed the value
was much higher, possibly $350,000. (R. 1113 ,r 75.) He claimed that he sold the
interest to Theta because he was "broke" and that Jennings exploited his poor financial
situation. (R. 1113 ,r,r 76-77.) Hansen also claimed he had another opportunity to sell the
10
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property for $350,000 but that Jennings would not allow it. (R. 1113 ,r 77.) The trial
court found Hansen's testimony concerning value "suspect" and "gave no weight" to it.
(R. 1118-19 ,r,r 9-10.)

At the March 29 closing, which took place at Southern Utah Title, Hansen signed
an agreement as manager ofVC Holdings which redeemed VC Holdings' 31.8%
membership interest in NC. (R. 1112 ,r,r 69-70; Exs. 39 & 16; R. 1112 ,r 72.) In return
for VC Holdings' membership, JVC conveyed a 31.8% interest in the Property to VC
Holdings. (R. 1112 ,r,r 69-70; Exs. 39 & 16.) VC Holdings then sold its 31.8% interest in
the Property to Theta for $236,337. (R. 1112 ,r 71; Ex. 21.)
Of the $236,337 purchase price, $180,000 was placed into escrow. (R. 1113 ,r 74;
Ex. 20.) That amount would have satisfied the debt the Hansens owed to the Eskelsens.
(R. 1113 ,r 74.) Another portion of the purchase price went to NC to satisfy VC

Holdings' $54,270.50 debt as described in Jennings' January 4 letter to Tobler. (R. 1113
~

if 74; Ex. 20.)
The Hansens each signed resolutions certifying their authority to act for VC
Holdings. (Ex. 51. ) 4 Southern Utah Title prepared these resolutions as well as numerous
other documents for the closing, including a title commitment which showed no
encumbrances against JVC's interest in the Property. (R. 1124-25 ,r 34(d).) Southern
Utah Title also independently determined through its own due diligence that Hansen had

4

In addition, the Hansens signed a Waiver and Consent acknowledging that the
Durham Jones & Pinegar law firm did not represent them or VC Holdings in the
transaction. (R. 1113-14 ,r 78; Ex. 55.)
11
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authority to sign the closing documents for VC Holdings. (R. 1125 ,r,r 34(e)-(t).) That
due diligence included a search of the Division's website. (Id.) At the time of closing,
the Division's records confirmed that Hansen was VC Holdings' manager. (R. 1114 ,r
80; Ex. 53.) It did not reflect that the Eskelsens had any interest, managerial or
otherwise, in VC Holdings. (R. 1114 ,r 80; Ex. 53.)
Once the transaction funded, instead of paying the Eskelsens, Hansen instructed
Southern Utah Title to release the $180,000 from escrow to a company called ME
Jenkins Management, through which Hansen funneled the money to himself. (R. 1114 ,r
79; Exs. 51, 34.) He testified at trial that he "decided to do something he thought was
wrong and kept it for himself." (R. 1114 ,r 79.)
The day after closing, the title company recorded two warranty deeds in the office
of the Washington County recorder. (Exs. 16, 21.) With the first deed, NC conveyed an
undivided 31.8% interest in the Property to VC Holdings. (Ex. 16.) With the second
deed, VC Holdings conveyed that interest to Theta. (Ex. 21.)

F.

The Hansens go bankrupt.

On May 4-over a month after the deeds were recorded, Tobler contacted
Blanchard to inquire about the status of the escrow agreement. (R. 1114 ,r 81.) He
testified that Blanchard informed him that he had not been in contact with Hansen for a
very long time and that Tobler was free to contact or otherwise pursue the Hansens. (R.
1114 ,r 81.) A few months later the Eskelsens received notice that the Hansens had filed
for chapter 7 bankruptcy. (R. 1115 ,r 84.) That same day, Tobler searched the

12
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Washington County recorder's website and discovered the March 30 warranty deeds. (R.
1115 ,J 84.)
At a bankruptcy meeting of creditors, Hansen falsely informed the trustee that he
only received forgiveness of debt and did not tell the trustee about the $180,000 he took
for himself from the closing. (R. 1116 1 90.) In addition to his false testimony at the
creditor's meeting, the Hansens' bankruptcy filings contained various inaccuracies and
untruths. (R. 1111 164, 1115 ,r,r 86-87.) These false statements further impaired
Hansen's credibility at trial. (R. 1111

,r 64.)

On February 29, 2012, shortly after the

Hansens received a bankruptcy discharge, the Eskelsens updated VC Holdings'
information on file with the Division to show the Eskelsens as VC Holdings' managers.
(R. 1116 ,r,r 91-93; Ex. 38.)

G.

The trial court enters judgment for Theta.

The Eskelsens then sued the Hansens, VC Holdings, and Theta. (R. 2.) Under a
single cause of action for declaratory relief, the Eskelsens' complaint put forward various
theories all hoping for the same resolution: a judgment that VC Holdings, not Theta,
owns the 31.8% interest in the Property. (R. 12.) The Eskelsens' theories were, as
relevant to this appeal: (1) to void the transaction as a fraudulent transfer; (2) to
alternatively hold that Hansen lacked authority to act as VC Holdings' manager; or (3) to
declare that even if Hansen was VC Holding's manager that he did not have authority "to
transfer away all ofVC Holdings' assets ... " (R. 9-12.) After a two-day bench trial, the
trial court made detailed and extensive findings of fact (stated above) and related
~

conclusions oflaw disposing of each of these theories in Theta's favor. (R. 1102-1127.)

13
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There was no fraudulent transfer. It first concluded that there was no fraudulent
transfer because Utah's fraudulent transfer statute reaches only those transactions
involving a "debtor"-defined as "a person who is liable on a claim," Utah Code § 25-62( 6). (R. 1117-18 ,r,r 4-5.) Although the Hansens were "debtors," VC Holdings was not
because it was not a party to the Hansen/Eskelsen note. (R. 1118 ,r 5.) Since it was VC
Holdings which transferred its interest to Theta, the fraudulent transfer claim failed. (Id.)
Moreover, "[e]ven if the Hansens and VC Holdings['] interests can somehow be melded
together so as to become a 'Debtor,'" the claim still failed because the Eskelsens
presented no credible evidence or expert testimony that the $236,377 Theta paid was not
reasonably equivalent value. (R. 1118-19 ,r,r 8-10.)

Hansen was VC Holdings' manager. It next concluded that the Eskelsens took
no valid actions to remove Hansen as VC Holdings' manager "until long after the March
29, 2011 closing." (R. 1120 ,r 15.) They did not hold a meeting of members nor did they
produce any minutes or resolutions to show that proper action was taken as required by
VC Holdings' Operating Agreement and Utah law. (R. 1120 ,r,r 16-20.) Nor did the
Eskelsens comply with the requirements of the Operating Agreement and Utah law to
"execute and file with the Division a certificate of amendment of the Articles when ... (6)
there is a change in the identity of any Manager ... " (R. 1121

,r 22.)

Given these

failures, the Eskelsens "had not taken control of the Company by the closing date." (R.
1121

,r 24.)

~

Thus, when they sent their December 27, 2010 letter claiming to have

removed the Hansens as managers, they had no authority under the Operating Agreement
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to bind the company to that action. (R. 1120 ilil 19, 20; Ex. 40 - Operating Agreement§
3.4 ("A Member who is not also a Manager has no authority to bind the Company.").)
The trial court rejected the Eskelsens' efforts to blame everyone else for these
failures, finding that they were on notice after Blanchard questioned the propriety of the
their actions that they should have taken further "corporate steps" to take control,
including "having a documented member meeting where they removed the Hansens as
Managers; voted themselves in as new managers; and ... updated the state records to put
the world on notice that they were now the members and managers of VC Holdings." (R.
1121-22 il 25.) It found that the "simple act" of filing the change with the Division likely
would have caused Theta to pull out of the transaction. (R. 1122 ilil 26-28; R. 1242 am.

il

3.) Instead, both Jennings and Southern Utah Title's searches confirmed that Hansen was
the manager. (R. 1122 ilil 27-28.)
Ultimately, the trial court concluded that because the Eskelsens "did not properly
remove Mr. Hansen as the manager of VC Holdings; did not file a certificate of
amendment pursuant to paragraph 8.l(a) of the Operating Agreement; and, did not update
the Division's website prior to the March 29, 2011 closing ... Mr. Hansen, not the
Eskelsens, was the Manager of VC Holdings on March 29, 2011." (R. 1123 il 29.)

Hansen's actions as manager bind VC Holdings. Finally, the trial court rejected
the Eskelsens' contention that the transaction was voidable because Hansen somehow
exceeded his authority as manager in signing the closing documents. (R. 1123-27.) By
statute, a company is bound by the acts of its manager '"unless the manager had no
authority to act for the company in the particular matter and the lack of authority was
15
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expressly described in the articles of organization or the person with whom the manager
was dealing knew or otherwise had notice that the manager lacked authority."' (R. 1126

,r 37) (quoting Utah Code§ 48-2c-802(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2010) (Emphasis trial court's).)
"VC Holdings Articles of Organization contains no express language limiting Mr.
Hansen's authority, as Manager, to transfer VC Holdings assets." (R. 1126 ,r 38; Ex. 26.)
Rather, the only provision that restricted Hansen's authority was in the Operating
Agreement at Section 5.4, which required 51 % approval of the membership before
selling, leasing, exchanging, mortgaging, pledging, or disposing of "all or substantially
all of the Company's assets." (R. 1126 ,r 39.)
As the trial court framed it, "The issue then is whether Mr. Jennings knew that Mr.
Hansen had to have VC Holding's members approval before participating in the March
29, 2011 closing." (R. 1126 ,r 40.) It found that the Eskelsens "presented no evidence at
trial regarding this issue" and that Jennings "had no knowledge" of Section 5.4. (R.
1126-27,r 41.) It then detailed Jennings' efforts to ferret out and substantiate the
Eskelsens' claims after he received Tobler's letter. (R. 1123-27.) This, the trial court
found, was a "reasonable inquiry" that confirmed Hansen's authority to act. (R. 1123-27
,r,r 33-45.)
The trial court rejected the Eskelsens' claim that the onus remained with Jennings
to bird-dog them for information after his first request was ignored. (R. 1125 ,r 35.) It
reasoned that at this point, "[t]he ball, so to speak, was in the Eskelsens['] court and they
had the duty to provide the information Mr. Jennings had requested some three months
before the March 29, 2011 closing." (R. 1125 ,I 35.) They failed to do so. (Id.) Section
16
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5.5 of the Operating Agreement confirmed this conclusion as it expressly provides that
"no person has an obligation to inquire into the Manager's actual authority to act on [VC
Holdings'] behalf." (R. 1127,I 42; Operating Agreement§ 5.5.) Thus, the Eskelsens
could not shift the burden to Jennings to discover this limitation. (R. 1127 ,I 42.)
Accordingly, the trial court rejected the Eskelsens' claims and entered judgment in
favor of Theta on all counts. (R. 1127-28, 1098.) The Eskelsens appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

The Eskels ens proceed as though it was established that they removed

Hansen as manager of VC Holdings and installed themselves to that position. That is
false. Even if members have the unfettered right to remove a manager, they are required
to comply with the LLC Act and the mechanisms set forth the company's operating
agreement for that removal. The trial court found that the Eskelsens took no actions
required by either the LLC Act or the Operating Agreement to remove Hansen as VC
Holdings' manager. They did not hold and take action in a formal member meeting.
They did not act by written consent. They did not conduct an election to fill any
managerial vacancies. They did not amend the articles of organization. And they did not
designate themselves as managers in any filing with the Division. On appeal, the
Eskelsens do not challenge these findings. Nor do they challenge the trial court's
ultimate conclusion based on these facts. Accordingly, they have waived any challenge
to this conclusion on appeal.
Because Hansen was VC Holdings' manager at the time of the transaction, his
actions bind VC Holdings unless Theta "knew or otherwise had notice" that he lacked
17
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specific authority for that transaction. Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-802(2)(c) (LexisNexis
2007). The only restriction on authority was in Section 5 .4 of VC Holdings' Operating
Agreement. Whether Theta had notice or knowledge of this provision is a fact question.
The trial court found that Theta was without such notice or knowledge. In fact, it found
that Theta (through Jennings) conducted a reasonable inquiry that confirmed Hansen's
authority to act. The Eskelsens do not marshal the evidence to challenge these fact
findings on appeal and have not demonstrated that these findings are clearly erroneous.
2.

Instead of focusing on what Theta knew or had notice of, the Eskelsens

argue about what it should have known based on speculation about what its attorneys
might have known and attempt to impute that speculation to Theta under agency
principles. They claim that this Court should hold that a client of a law firm is imputed
with all the knowledge of all the attorneys in that firm, including all work performed for
all firm clients. That view of the agency relationship goes too far and presumes too
much. Clients are not charged with a lawyer's knowledge concerning a transaction in
which the lawyer does not represent the client. Nor are they charged with knowledge of
work their lawyer performed for another firm client where the lawyer forgot about or did
not perceive the relevance to the other client's matter. Here, the Eskelsens seek to impute
to Theta knowledge of work that Blanchard prepared for a different client, for which
Blanchard had no clear recollection of performing and was unaware of the potential
relevance to the transaction between Theta and VC Holdings. The trial court listened to
all testimony on this matter, including Blanchard, Jennings, and Tobler and refused to
ij)

make the far reaching findings that the Eskelsens demand this Court infer. Instead, it
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only went so far as to find that if it imputed any knowledge to Theta through its attorneys,
it is information that was already known and would not amount to notice or knowledge of
any restriction on Hansen's authority to act.
3.

A fraudulent transfer requires a debtor-creditor relationship in which the

debtor transfers its assets beyond the creditor's reach. The Eskelsens did not establish a
fraudulent transfer because the asset that was transferred belonged to VC Holdings, not
the Hansens. VC Holdings was not the Eskelsens' debtor. Moreover, even assuming that
the Hansens and VC Holdings could be considered a single "debtor," the Eskelsens failed
to convince the trial court that there was fraudulent intent. The trial court found that
Theta paid reasonably equivalent value for VC Holdings' property interest which was set
aside in escrow and would have been sufficient to satisfy the Hansens' debt to the
Eskelsens. A fraudulent transfer does not occur if one asset is traded out for another that
would be sufficient to satisfy the debtor's obligation. Hansen's decision to keep the
funds for himself did not render the underlying transaction fraudulent. And because the
Eskelsens never demonstrated their fraudulent transfer claim, the burden never shifted to
Theta to prove its good faith purchaser defense.
4.

Finally, the Eskelsens quibble about various findings of fact, taking issue

with the trial court's denial of their Rule 52(b) motion to amend the findings to interpret
the evidence according to their theory of the case. But the findings the trial court made
(and refused to make) are adequately supported by the evidence. It did not abuse its
discretion in turning away the Eskelsens' attempt to relitigate those issues.
This Court should affirm.
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ARGUMENT

I.

The Trial Court Properly Recognized the Validity of the Transaction.

The Eskelsens begin their brief (Points I and II) diving headlong into principalagency issues, pointing fingers, and assigning blame. But the appropriate starting point is
at the top: Hansen's authority as manager of VC Holdings.
A.

The trial court's conclusion that Hansen was VC Holdings' manager
when it sold its interest to Theta is not challenged on appeal.

The trial court devoted considerable time and attention on the question of whether
Hansen was VC Holdings' manager at the time of the transaction. It made findings and
ultimately answered in the affirmative. Its conclusion was in all respects correct and is
unchallenged on appeal.
VC Holdings was established as a manager-managed company under the Utah
Revised Limited Liability Company Act ("LLC Act") 5 • The LLC Act requires that the
initial managers of a manager-managed company "be designated in the articles of
organization," Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-804(l)(a) (LexisNexis 2007), and "after the
initial managers, the managers shall be those persons identified in documents filed with
the division ... " Id. § 48-2c-804(1 )(b). Managers serve until "death, withdrawal, or

5

Effective July 1, 2013, the Legislature has repealed and replaced the LLC Act. See
2013 Utah Laws Ch. 412; Utah Code§ 631-2-248(3). However, "because we apply the
law as it existed at the time of the events giving rise to this suit," Taghipour v. Jerez,
2002 UT 74, ,I 5 n.1, 52 P.3d 1252, the LLC Act contained in title 48, chapter 2c of the
Utah Code in effect at the time governs these proceedings.
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i)

removal." Id. § 48-2c-804(6)(c)(i). 6 Any new managers, including those filling any
vacancy, must be elected by a majority of the members. See id. § 48-2c-804(6)(a). There
is no requirement that managers also be members. Id. § 48-2c-804(6)(d). Thus, losing
membership status does not automatically strip a person of their position as a manager.

See id.
Like the LLC Act, VC Holdings' Operating Agreement reiterates that nonmembers may act as managers. See Operating Agreement § 5 .3( d) ("The fact that a
Manager is not also a Member in no way limits the Manager's right to vote on any matter
properly within the scope of the Manager's authority under this Agreement."). It also
provides that a manager serves until resignation, removal, bankruptcy, or death. Id. §
5.1 0(a). 7 As in the LLC Act, the Operating Agreement requires VC Holdings to "execute
and file with the Division a certificate of amendment of the Articles when ... there is a
change in the identity of any Manager." Id.§ 8.l(a).
Moving from management to membership, a limited liability company "is a legal
entity distinct from its members." Utah Code Ann.§ 48-2c-104 (LexisNexis 2007).
Members may take certain actions with or without meetings, but only in compliance with
the company's operating agreement. See id. § § 48-2c-704, -706 (LexisN exis 2007 &

6

The statute lists other circumstances for when a manager's service may end, but
those are not applicable here, were not otherwise raised below, and in any event, VC
Holdings' Operating Agreement limits those grounds to resignation, removal,
bankruptcy, or death. See Operating Agreement § 5.1 0(a). See also Utah Code § 48-2c502(1) (allowing operating agreement to override default provisions of LLC Act).
7

As indicated above, the Hansens' bankruptcy occurred after the transaction at issue.
(R. 1114 ,I 81.)
21
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Supp. 2010). Consistent with that, VC Holdings' Operating Agreement provides that "[a]
Member who is not also a Manager has no authority to bind the Company." Operating
Agreement§ 3.4. Rather, members may take action in only one of two ways: (1) through
a duly called and properly noticed meeting, see id. § 3.3(a); or (2) "without a meeting by
written consent describing the action and signed by all members," id. § 3.3(b).
Within this legal framework, the trial court reviewed, considered, and rejected the
Eskelsens' assertion that they removed Hansen as manager. For starters, Hansen was
identified as VC Holdings' manager in all documents on file with the Division, including
its amended articles, thereby giving notice to the world of that fact-all in compliance
with the LLC Act and Operating Agreement. There was no public record to the contrary.
After "foreclosing" out the Hansens' membership interests, the Eskelsens failed to
follow the straightforward requirements of the LLC Act and Operating Agreement for
removing Hansen as manager and installing themselves to that position. They did not
hold and take action in a member meeting. They did not act by written consent. They
did not conduct an election to fill any managerial vacancies. They did not amend the
articles of organization. And they did not designate themselves as managers in any filing
with the Division. They don't argue otherwise in their brief. Instead, as with their
December 27 letter to the Hansens, they simply proclaim that they "removed the Hansens
as managers and placed themselves in that position." (Br. 33.) 8 That wholly ignores the

8

No one doubts that if they were members, the Eskelsens had the right to remove
Hansen as manager "at any time," "with or without cause." Operating Agreement
§ 5.l0(c). But having the right to take a particular action does not excuse the failure to
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legal requirements for valid action and the trial court's findings that those requirements
were never met.
As the appellants, if the Eskelsens thought the trial court erred in this
determination, they had an obligation to raise this issue on appeal in compliance with the
rules-that is, by briefing the issue with authority and analysis. See Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9). They failed to do so. As such, they have waived the issue. See Pixton v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ("Generally, where an
appellant fails to brief an issue on appeal, the point is waived."). The trial court's
conclusion that Hansen was VC Holdings' manager when the transaction with Theta
closed on March 29, 2011 was proper and otherwise stands unchallenged on appeal. 9

B.

Hansen's actions as manager bind VC Holdings.

Because Hansen was its manager, his actions bind VC Holdings unless it is shown
that he "had no authority to act for the company in the particular matter and the lack of
authority was expressly described in the articles of organization or the person with whom

follow the required procedures for taking that action. See Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31,
Under the LLC Act, "managers may be removed through
mechanisms described in a company's operating agreement." Id. ,r 20. There is nothing
in VC Holdings' Operating Agreement that allows its members to remove a manager
through a letter from counsel proclaiming a management change. Rather, as the trial
court concluded, that letter was a nullity. See Operating Agreement§ 3.4 ("A Member
who is not also a Manager has no authority to bind the Company.").

,r 20, 158 P.3d 540.

9

The Eskelsens make a series of conclusory agency-based arguments all of which are
premised on their assertion that Hansen was not the manager. (Br. 35-36.) These include
that they "did not grant Hansen authority," that the Hansens were "no longer managers of
VC Holdings and ... did not have the Eskelsens' approval," and that the Eskelsens did
not ratify the Hansens' actions. (Id.) Since these arguments hinge on the same
assumption, they are without merit.
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the manager was dealing knew or otherwise had notice that the manager lacked
authority." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-802(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2007) (emphasis added).
The Eskelsens seize upon this language, point to Section 5.4 that "Managers may
take no action with respect to: the sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge or other
disposition of all or substantially all of the Company's assets ... " without the approval of
members "whose aggregate Membership Interest is at least 51 percent .... ," and contend
that Hansen violated this provision because he did not have their approval for the Theta
transaction and that Theta "knew" it. (Br. 33-35.) Not so.

Notice/knowledge are fact questions. First, what someone knew or didn't know,
or what they had notice of, are fact questions. See 4447 Assocs. v. First Sec. Fin., 889
P.2d 467,471 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("A determination concerning whether a party had
notice or knowledge of a particular transaction or occurrence is a finding of fact and 'will
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous."') (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)); In re
Adoption of Baby B., 2012 UT 35, ,r 45,308 P.3d 382 (explaining that "knowledge is a
'subjective ... state of mind,' which normally is a fact question.") (quoting State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994)). The trial court found that Jennings did not know or
have notice of any restriction on authority. (R. 1126-27,I 41.)
The Eskelsens do not challenge this finding. Instead, they acknowledge it (at 35)
and argue around it, asserting that Jennings "had significant and continual notice of the
Eskelsens' claim," and then make the leap that "this must amount to knowledge that the
Hansens lacked authority, or at least their authority was in serious question and they
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should not be dealt with at the exclusion of the Eskelsens." (Br. 35.) This contention is
woven throughout their brief. (Br. 29-33.)
But these self-serving conclusions do. not begin to discharge the Eskelsens' burden
of showing that the trial court's findings "are 'not adequately supported by the record'"
when "' all disputes in the evidence"' are resolved '"in a light most favorable to the trial
court's determination."' Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp v. Pinecrest Pipeline
Operating Co., 2004 UT 67, iJ 33, 98 P.3d 1 (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 935-36). The
Eskelsens' conclusory statements and conclusions are not valid substitutes for marshaling
the evidence-a necessary step for any party hoping to adequately discharge their burden
of challenging any finding of fact on appeal. See State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10, iJ 42, 326
P.3d 645 ("[W]e reiterate that a party challenging a factual finding or sufficiency of the
evidence to support a verdict will almost certainly fail to carry its burden of persuasion
on appeal if it fails to marshal."); Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact
finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding.").
The trial court's unchallenged findings. Second, not only did the trial court find

that Jennings had no notice or knowledge of the restriction on Hansen's authority, it also
found that he exhausted his efforts to determine whether any restriction existed and came
up empty. He wrote to the Eskelsens' counsel for documentary support of the Eskelsens'
claims. He was ignored. The Eskelsens chalk this failure up to an ethical dilemma of
dealing with a represented person-a "loophole," they say. (Br. 28, 32.) That is not true.
Tobler could have simply provided the information directly to Jennings' attorneys. He
knew who they were. He thought he had made contact with them. He did nothing.
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Jennings also searched the Division's website and saw no change there. And
despite the requirements of the LLC Act and the Operating Agreement, the Eskelsens did
absolutely nothing to make any change, which the trial court found would have put the
world on notice of a potential issue. Instead, Jennings' search simply confirmed what he
had long known: Hansen was the manager.
The Eskelsens even fault the trial court for focusing on VC Holdings' Articles of
Organization. (Br. 34.) But unlike an operating agreement, a company's articles are
public record. Thus, parties dealing with the company are on notice of any limitations on
authority contained in the articles. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-802(2)(c); Zions Gate

~

RV Resort v. Oliphant, 2014 UT App 98, iJ 14, 326 P.3d 118 (explaining that filing
articles with the Division gives "notice to all third parties of the limitations placed on the
authority of its managers"). The trial court astutely recognized that there was no
restriction similar to Section 5.4 in VC Holdings' Articles that would have imparted
notice to any third party-Jennings, Theta, their attorneys, or the title company-that VC
Holdings' manager was restricted from acting without member approval for any specific
type of transaction.
Ultimately, the Eskelsens want to equate unverified suspicions with actual notice
and knowledge. But those are different things. What Theta might suspect does not
equate to notice or knowledge. See, e.g., In re Adoption ofBaby B., 2012 UT 35, ,r 55
(what someone knew or could have known "implies proof beyond mere belief' and
"connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation"). Knowledge is based
on facts and inferences drawn from those facts. See id. (knowledge "'applies to any body
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of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on
good grounds"') (quotation and citation omitted). Here, the facts and inferences, as the
trial court found them, all pointed in the same direction: Theta had no notice or
knowledge of the restriction in Section 5.4. (R. 1126-27,I 41.) The Eskelsens do not,
have not, and cannot show otherwise.

Section 5.5 binds VC Holdings. Finally, missing from the Eskelsens' brief is any
acknowledgement of Section 5.5 of the Operating Agreement which the trial court looked
to as confirmation of its conclusions. Section 5.5 provides:
Agency Power and Authority. A Manager apparently acting for the Company in
the usual course of its business has the power to bind the Company and no person
has an obligation to inquire into the Manager's actual authority to act on the
Company's behalf. However, if a Manager acts outside the scope of the
Manager's actual authority, the Manager will indemnify the Company for and
costs of damages it incurs as a result of the unauthorized act.

~

Operating Agreement§ 5.5 (Emphasis added.) We learn two things from this provision.
First, that no one, including Jennings, had any obligation to inquire as to Hansen's actual
authority to act for VC Holdings. And second, that even assuming Hansen violated
Section 5.4, the remedy is a direct action against Hansen for any resulting damages, not
to unwind the transaction with Theta. Under Section 5.5, the Eskelsens cannot obtain the
remedy they seek in this action: VC Holdings is bound by Hansen's actions, regardless of
any restriction his authority. 10
~
10

The LLC Act allows a company's operating agreement to modify the default rules
in the LLC Act governing company management. See Utah Code Ann.§ 48-2c-502(1)
(LexisNexis 2007); Duke, 2007 UT 31, ,I 19 ( explaining that "the LLC Act grants broad
authority to the members of an LLC to override its default provisions relating to 'the
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***
In sum, cannot overcome the trial court's findings by attempting to equate
unverified suspicions with actual notice, knowledge, and evidence. They blame Jennings
for not doing more given what they call the "serious question" about Hansen's authority.
(Br. 35.) But the trial court found that Jennings exhausted his efforts to determine
whether there was any restriction on Hansen's authority and found none. What he did
find only confirmed that Hansen was manager. These extensive and detailed findings are
unchallenged on appeal and adequately supported by the evidence. And given the trial
court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses on what they knew or didn't
know or had notice of under the circumstances of this case, the trial court's findings are
not clearly erroneous. This Court should affirm.
II.

Theorizing About what Theta's Attorneys Knew and Imputing the Unknown
to Theta is Without Basis in Law or Fact.
A.

General agency principles coupled with speculation do not displace
bedrock principles of confidentiality, privilege, and actual evidence.

Perhaps recognizing the futility of any challenge to the trial court's findings, the
Eskelsens begin their brief (Br. 26-33, Points I and II) focusing not on what Theta knew

management of the company' through recognizing the specific terms contained in a
company's operating agreement .... "). Section 5.5 binds VC Holdings to the actions of
its managers and excuses third parties from any obligation to inquire about that authority.
The tradeoff the Operating Agreement provides is that the manager is personally liable to
the company for his or her actions, see Operating Agreement§ 5.5, a remedy that is
broader in scope than the default provision in the LLC Act, see Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c807(1 ).
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or had notice of, but on what they believe it should have known based on speculation
about what its attorneys might have known. That argument fails.
As a starting point, no one doubts that when an attorney acts for a client, the
attorney is acting as the client's agent. But the Eskelsens' view of this agency
relationship presumes too much and asks this Court to go too far. Grafting together
quotations from a selection of different cases about agency principles and the attorneyclient relationship, the Eskelsens ask this Court to hold that by hiring a law firm, the
client is automatically imputed with all the knowledge that all attorneys within that firm
possess, including all work they have performed for other clients. (Br. 25-30.) They
don't stop there. They go further arguing that the matters for which knowledge is
imputed do not have to be proven, but instead can be shown conclusively through
speculation. (Br. 27.) That is not and cannot be the law.
First, neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has taken such a limitless
view of attorney-as-agent. In Von Hake v. Thomas, 858 P.2d 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1993),
the primary case on which the Eskelsens rely, the question was whether a client
represented by counsel in litigation could claim ignorance of a court's decision for which
his counsel was provided notice. See id. at 195 n.3. Under agency principles, this Court
answered with an obvious yes-a client cannot claim ignorance of a court order sent to
his lawyer. Id. In Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480, the Utah Supreme
Court acknowledged these agency principles as a general proposition, but recognized
their limits. There, it held that because "a party voluntarily chooses her attorney" she is
"generally bound" by the attorney's "acts or omissions." Id.

,r 76.

Thus, an attorney's
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negligence in representing a client is attributable to the client. See id. ,I 76. But the Court
also recognized that if the attorney is not acting on behalf of the client, the unknowing
client should not be held responsible, even under agency principles. See id. ,I 77. In
other words, there are limits and constraints to these rules. The Eskelsens want this Court
to rip the top off.
They assert that, "[t]hrough his attorneys, Mr. Jennings had full knowledge of the
loan between the Eskelsens and the Hansens because Mr. Blanchard had actually drafted
those agreements" for the Hansens. (Br. 30.) And further, that he should have known
that Blanchard was going to prepare an escrow agreement for Hansens. (Id.) They are
wrong.
First, Blanchard put the loan agreements together for the Hansens, not Jennings
(Theta). (R. 868-871 Trial Tr. 195:4-25, 196-197, 198:1-12.) "A client is not charged
with a lawyer's knowledge concerning a transaction in which the lawyer does not
represent the client." Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 28 cmt. b
(2000). That does not change simply because the two are represented by the same firm.

See id. ("The knowledge of a lawyer not personally engaged in representing a client but
in the same firm is not attributed to the client .... ").
Rather, to impute such knowledge requires a showing that "the lawyer acquiring
the knowledge is aware that the information is relevant to his or her firm's representation
of the client." Id. If the lawyer forgot about the information or did not perceive its
relevance to the client's matter, there is nothing to impute. See id. ("The client might
show that the lawyer had forgotten the information or did not perceive its relevance,
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whenever a client could introduce similar evidence about the client's own state of
knowledge.").
At trial, Blanchard could scarcely remember preparing the agreement-he thought
Ci

his paralegal might have thrown it together, it was emailed with blanks to Hansens to fill
out, he could not recall ever discussing with the Hansens, and he never received back
signed copies. (R. 868-69 Trial Tr. 195:4-25, 196:1-20.) He testified that by the time he
spoke with Tobler: "It's possible I had forgotten. I think I remembered, but maybe Imaybe I didn't. Again, I didn't pull it up. I didn't look at it. I didn't see it. Frankly, I
didn't spend a lot of time on it ... " (R. 8 88 Trial Tr. 215: 1-7.) The trial court listened to
this testimony and concluded that there was nothing it could impute to Theta.
What's more, "[a] lawyer's knowledge is not attributed to the client when
communicating it would violate the lawyer's obligations to another client." Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 28 cmt. b. Those obligations are the bedrock
principles of confidentiality and privilege. See Utah R. Profl Conduct l.6(a) ("A lawyer
shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client
gives informed consent ... "); Utah R. Evid. 504(b)( 1) (preserving for the client the
privilege to "refuse to disclose, and to prevent any other person from disclosing,
confidential communications" made to counsel to facilitate the "the rendition of
professional legal services to the client").
The Eskelsens demand this Court hold that if an attorney acquires knowledge from
one client that affects another, the knowledge is imputed to the other client without
regard to whether sharing the information would violate obligations of confidentiality and

31
STG_710960

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

privilege. They simply ask for a sweeping rule of mandatory imputation of everything
regardless of the circumstances.
After asking for this destabilizing rule, the Eskelsens imagine the things they think
Jennings should have known because Tobler spoke with Blanchard about resolving a debt
between the Hansens and Eskelsens and Blanchard then had a conversation with
Engstrom. They have to imagine these things because they concede there is no evidence
of what was discussed. (Br. 27) (conceding that "it is unknown" what was discussed with
Jennings "but also of no consequence").) Still, they argue that the trial court should have
"imput[ed] him with all the knowledge his attorneys had gained about this case from the
beginning of January 2011, through March 2011." (Br. 28.)
The trial court listened to Blanchard and Jennings' testimony at trial, judged their
credibility, and declined to make the far-reaching findings that the Eskelsens ask this
Court to infer and then impute. (Engstrom was not even a trial witness (R. 674-1072)what he knew and understood is pure speculation.) From that, this Court can only infer
that in rejecting the Eskelsens' contentions, the trial court was unconvinced that
Blanchard knew what the Eskelsens claimed he should have known and therefore could
not impute the unknown and unproven to Jennings. In fact, the only finding the trial
court was willing to make on this issue was that "if' Jennings knew what Blanchard
knew, it was only that Blanchard spoke with Tobler about an escrow agreement and that
Blanchard was not going to prepare it. (R. 1125 ,r 34(h)-(i).) It also found that when
Blanchard emailed Tobler on March 22, that Blanchard was not aware of any discussions
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between Jennings and Hansen to sell the Property interest. (R. 1109 ,r 48.) That tells the
Court all it needs to know about the strength of the Eskelsens' evidence on this question.
In fact, as the trial court recognized (R. 1125 ,r,r 34(h), (i)), the transaction that
ultimately occurred was essentially the deal the Eskelsens were willing to go along with
under the proposed escrow agreement-one in which the Hansens sold VC Holdings'
interest in the Property to Theta, with the proceeds deposited in escrow for distribution
between the Hansens and Eskelsens.
Taking it a step further, if Jennings knew everything Blanchard did, he would
Ei)

know that Blanchard disputed that the Eskelsens had properly foreclosed on the
membership interests and that Tobler never claimed that Hansen had no authority to sign
off on a proposed escrow agreement for VC Holdings. In other words, Jennings would
know nothing more than he did, which was not sufficient to impart notice of any
restriction on authority. That is particularly true given that there is no evidence Theta's
lawyers were aware of the Section 5.4 restriction.
The trial court's refusal to impute unproven "knowledge" to Theta through its
attorneys was not clearly erroneous.

B.

The Eskelsens merely reargue their case below as opposed to
acknowledging and properly challenging the trial court's findings.

The remainder of the Eskelsens' arguments in their Points I and II simply repeat
what was have addressed elsewhere concerning notice. They fail for the same reasons.
They make claims about what Jennings may have learned ifhe inquired further (Br. 32),
Gi>

but ignore the trial court's extensive findings that the inquiry was exhaustive and turned
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up nothing. They blame Blanchard for "lulling" them into inaction (Br. 32) but ignore
the trial court's finding that Blanchard was questioning the Eskelsens' actions which
should have caused the Eskelsens to actually follow the requirements of the Operating
Agreement and the LLC Act and take corporate actions to assert control.
Fundamentally, that is the problem with the Eskelsens' arguments. They ignore
what the trial court found and simply reargue their case below. That gets them nowhere
on appeal. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, il 78, 100 P.3d 1177 (explaining that an
appellant cannot "simply restate or review evidence that points to an alternate finding or a
finding contrary to the trial court's finding of fact"), limited by State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT
10, ilil 41-42, 326 P.3d 645. At no point do the Eskelsens seriously confront or challenge
the trial court's factual findings. At no point do they acknowledge the evidence favorable
to those findings. At no point do they acknowledge the deference given to the trial court
to weigh conflicting evidence. See Smith v. Utah Cent. Credit Union, 727 P.2d 219, 22021 (Utah 1986) ("When the evidence conflicts, we necessarily give deference to the fact
finder and acknowledge his advantageous position vis-a-vis the witnesses, the evidence,
and the parties."). And at no point do they acknowledge that the things they complain
were wrongly decided-whether a reasonable inquiry was conducted, whether a party
had notice, and what individuals knew or didn't know-are fact intensive questions
reserved for the trial court. See, e.g., Brewster v. Brewster, 2010 UT App 260, iJ 14,241
P .3d 357 (explaining that "because the determination of what constitutes a reasonable
inquiry ... depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case"); Mc Tee v.
Weber Ctr. Condo. Ass 'n, 2016 UT App 134, il 11,379 P.3d 41 (determining what
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someone "knew or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known ...
depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case" and is committed to the
trial court's discretion) (citations omitted). The trial court resolved the evidence in
Theta's favor. It is unchallenged. This Court should affirm.

III. The ThetaNC Holdings' Transaction was not a Fraudulent Transfer.
The Eskelsens next contend (Point IV at 36-40) that even if Hansen had authority
to bind VC Holdings, the trial court erred in not voiding the transaction as a fraudulent
transfer. Again, they are wrong.

A.

The transaction between VC Holdings and Theta does not qualify as a
fraudulent transfer.

"A fraudulent transfer in Utah first requires a creditor-debtor relationship."

Bradford v. Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, ,I 14, 993 P.2d 887. At its core, "a fraudulent
transfer occurs when a debtor transfers substantially all his or her assets to another to
defraud a creditor or avoid a debt." Id. The Utah Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
("UFTA") defines a "debtor" as "a person who is liable on a claim." Utah Code Ann. §
25-6-2(6) (LexisNexis 2013). A "creditor" is "a person who has a claim." Id. § 25-62(4). And an "asset" is "property of a debtor ... " Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-2(2).
The transaction that the Eskelsens claim was fraudulent was between VC Holdings
and Theta. VC Holdings was not a "debtor" as defined in the UFTA: it was not "liable"
to the Eskelsens "on a claim"; it was not a party to the Hansen/Eskelsen promissory note.
Nor was the asset the property of the debtors. The asset-the interest in the Propertybelonged to VC Holdings, not the Hansens. See Utah Code Ann.§ 48-2c-701(2) (an
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asset of the entity belongs to the entity, not its members). The Eskelsens appear to
acknowledge this. (Br. 38-39.) Still, they argue that the transaction "should be
considered a fraudulent transfer" because it "effectively gutted the value from their
asset." (Id. 38.) They cite no authority for this proposition. Instead, they ask this Court
to loosen up and expand these definitions through a liberal reading of the UFTA. But
these definitions are simple and straightforward. They are not susceptible to judicial
expansion. Had the legislature intended the term "debtor" to include the debtor's
employer, or the term "asset" to include property that the debtor does not own but
controls for others, it would have said so. See Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship,
2011 UT 50, ,r 14, 267 P.3d 863 (reiterating that the best evidence of the legislature's
intent is "the plain language of the statute itself') (citations and quotations omitted). It
did not. Courts are not at liberty to enlarge the scope of statutory language to cover more
than the plain language envisions. See id. ,r 15; Rupp v. Mojfo, 2015 UT 71, ,r,r 15-16,
358 P.3d 1060 (refusing to read definitions in the UFTA beyond the plain language).
The case on which the Eskelsens rely, Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah
1987), is not to the contrary. There, the Court addressed the scope of the statutory
definition of a "conveyance." Id. at 1260. The debtor in that case attempted to put his
assets beyond the reach of creditors by re-characterizing a conveyance of property as a
loss through forfeiture. See id. at 1260-61. The Utah Supreme Court didn't buy it, and
its language about construing the UFTA "with liberality" was in direct response to that
re-characterization. See id. Not so here. Here, there is no effort to re-characterize the
nature of the transaction to fall outside the UFTA.
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Demonstrating the limitations of Butler is the more recent case, Rupp v. Moffo. In

Rupp, the Utah Supreme Court held that the plain language definitions in the UFTA
should not be expanded to reach beyond what the plain language permits. See 2015 UT
71, ,r 16. The definitions at issue here do not reach transactions incurred by others merely
because someone who happens to be a debtor participates. The Eskelsens' argument is
tantamount to urging this Court "to ignore this plain language" and hold "that the
[UFTA] cannot mean what it says." Rupp, 2015 UT 71, ,r 16. That is not permissible.

See id.
Moreover, the Eskelsens forget that VC Holdings was paid $236,337 for which the
Hansens received $180,000, a more than sufficient amount to satisfy the $120,000 debt to
the Eskelsens. Hansen's decision to funnel that money to himself after the transaction
funded and concluded may have been suspect. But it does not taint the transaction's
legitimacy. The UFTA "applies to transfers where the debtor does not receive reasonably
equivalent value in return. In cases where the debtor does receive reasonably equivalent
value, the transfer puts one asset beyond the reach of the creditors, but replaces the asset
with one of equivalent value, thus avoiding any harm to creditors." Rupp, 2015 UT 71,

,r 17.

The asset was not "gutted," it was replaced.
That leads to still another threshold problem for the Eskelsens. They are quick to

forget that in their December 27, 2010 letter to the Hansens, they admitted to foreclosing
out the Hansens' membership interests in VC Holdings "in full satisfaction of [the
Hansens '] obligation to them." If that is true the Hansens were no longer debtors and the
Eskelsens no longer creditors. The Eskelsens cannot claim at once that they got the
37
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Hansens' membership interests in "full satisfaction" of the Hansens' $120,000 obligation
but still pursue that same obligation. Those two positions cannot co-exist. This provides
yet another reason to affirm. 11
Simply put, the fraudulent transfer claim fails because the fundamental
relationships required for the claim do not exist. This Court should affirm.
B.

Even if the interests of VC Holdings and Hansen "can be melded
together" as a single "debtor," it does not change the result.

As stated, because the essential elements are missing, judgment on the fraudulent
transfer claim should be affirmed. But as the trial court explained, "[e]ven if the Hansens
and VC Holdings['] interests can somehow be melded together so as to become a

@,

'Debtor,'"-and assuming this Court can imagine for the Eskelsens how they can remain
creditors on an obligation they deemed satisfied-the Eskelsens' fraudulent transfer
claim still falters because they failed to establish the intent element of that claim.
The Eskelsens claim (at 37) that the transaction with Theta was fraudulent because
it was done "with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor[.]"
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(l)(a). Fraudulent intent is a fact question. See Lakeside
Lumber Prod., Inc. v. Evans, 2005 UT App 87, ,I 9, 110 P.3d 154. The UFTA lists

~

several factors that a trial court may consider in determining whether there was actual
intent. See id. § 25-6-5(2). However, it is not required to consider and dispose of each
(I)

11

This issue was not raised below. However, "an appellate court may affirm the
judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the
record." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, 120, 52 P.3d 1158. Though overlooked by trial
counsel, this ground is apparent in the record.
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factor; nor are these enumerated factors exhaustive of what the trial court may consider.

See id (providing that "consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether ... "
listing enumerated factors) (emphasis added); Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. Baird,
781 P .2d 452, 462-63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that the enumerated factors are
not exhaustive or determinative). Rather, the value of the enumerated factors is flexible,
determined by the unique facts and circumstances of each case. See Lakeside Lumber

Prod., 2005 UT App 87, ,r 9. As such, the fact finder is free to consider and weigh all the
surrounding evidence and assign relative value to any factors in resolving the intent
question. See id. (explaining that the '"value"' of the enumerated factors "as evidence is
relative not absolute."') (quoting Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 781 P.2d at 462).
After making the leap that VC Holdings and its assets should be considered as one
with the Hansens, the Eskelsens copy and paste the statutory factors and devote barely a
page rearguing their fraud theory as though we were back at trial. (Br. 39-40.) What
they do not do is confront, much less challenge, the trial court's fact findings, including
what the trial court considered important in ultimately concluding there was no fraudulent
intent.
The trial court's primary focus was on reasonably equivalent value. See Utah
Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2)(h) ("the value of the consideration received by the debtor was
reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation

39
STG_710960

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

incurred"). 12 For good reason. As explained above, the UFTA "provides a remedy for
creditors who are actually harmed when a debtor transfers property; it does not provide a
remedy in cases of only theoretical harm." Rupp, 2015 UT 71, ,r 17. Thus, in
determining whether fraudulent intent is present in a particular transaction, the trial court
can rightly consider whether the debtor receives "reasonably equivalent value in return."

Id. See also Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(2)(h).
Theta was not handed VC Holdings' redeemed interest in the Property for a wink
and something described as ten dollars and other valuable consideration. Theta paid
$236,337 for that interest. A substantial portion of that-$180,000-was placed into
escrow and would have satisfied the Hansens' (already satisfied) $120,000 debt.
As explained, Hansen's decision to direct these funds elsewhere was separate from
Theta's involvement. Seeking to taint the transaction, the Eskelsens attempt to pass off
Hansen's confessional testimony that he did "something wrong" as the transaction with
Theta. (Br. 40.) That is false. As the trial court found, this testimony was Hansen's
decision to funnel the money to himself rather than paying it to the Eskelsens. (R. 1114 ,r

12

In its findings and conclusions, the trial court's discussion of "reasonably
equivalent value" appears to have been in the context of subsection (b) in§ 25-6-5(1). It
is unclear from the trial record under which prong of§ 25-6-5(1) the Eskelsens were
advancing their fraudulent transfer claim. Their complaint was cryptic (R. 2-13) and
their trial brief cited 25-6-5 generally and asserted that "the transfer was made with the
intent to defraud the Eskelsens." (R. 655.) On appeal, they finally narrow in on
subsection (a). (Br. 37.) But "reasonably equivalent value" presents a barrier under
either subsection (a) or (b)-under (b) by definition and under (a) as a factor in
determining intent. Here, it was the entirety of the trial court's analysis and thus we can
infer the most significant factor the trial court considered in refusing to find fraudulent
intent.
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79.) This, the trial court found, was Hansen's decision "to do something he thought was
wrong and kept it for himself," not the decision to sell VC Holdings' interest to Theta.
(R. 1114 ,r 79.) The Eskelsens also try to tie Hansen's testimony about relying on
vi&)

Jennings' advice to this false narrative. (Br. 40.) That ignores the trial court's express
finding that this testimony was not credible.
What's more, there was no contrary evidence on the question of value. The only
thing presented at trial was Hansen's testimony-his belief that the value was much
higher. The trial court found this testimony suspect and gave it no weight. Fraud is
never presumed, it must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See Bradford v.

Bradford, 1999 UT App 373, ,r 18, 993 P.2d 887 ("A creditor who claims a debtor
transferred property with actual intent to defraud under section 25-6-S(l)(a) must
establish that claim by clear and convincing evidence."); Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass 'n,
781 P.2d at 462 ("Actual fraud is never presumed, but instead must be established by
clear and convincing evidence."). And the Eskelsens produced no expert testimony
regarding value-either for the Property or for the interest in NC. Both types of
valuations typically require the testimony of qualified experts. See, e.g., Thomas v.

Johnson, 801 P.2d 186, 188-89 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (discussing expert testimony by
appraisers in establishing fair market value of property in a deficiency action); Wasatch

Bank v. Leany, 727 P.2d 633, 634 (Utah 1986) (affirming trial court's determination of
fair market value based on testimony of plaintiffs expert); Utah Dep 't ofTransp. v.

Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1035 (Utah 1984) (discussing qualifications for individuals to give
testimony and opinion of property value and damages); Hogle v. Zinetics Med. Inc., 2002
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UT 121, ,r,r 23-31, 63 P.3d 80 (addressing valuation of interests in corporation and expert
opinion regarding value). The trial court found the absence of this expert testimony
significant.
Ignoring all of this, the Eskelsens remain content to reargue their case below (Br.
39-40), picking those things that they think are important instead of acknowledging that
the fact finder saw it differently. For example, they hammer away (at 39-40) on the idea
that Jennings was an "insider" and claim that there were efforts to conceal the transaction
from the Eskelsens. But the trial court's findings make it clear that it was of significant
importance that this closing took place at a reputable title company which independently
prepared documents, obtained resolutions from the Hansens, and conducted searches of
the public record. And Jennings was not secreting anything. He asked for information
directly from the Eskelsen' s counsel. He got nothing. He conducted searches of the
public record himself and found nothing. He relied on Southern Utah Title's independent
determination that Hansen had authority to execute the closing documents thereby
confirming his own conclusions. (R. 1125 ,r 34(e)-(f).) As the trial court found, this
transaction was free of any of the hallmarks of fraud. The Eskelsens cannot simply ask
this Court to accept their view of the evidence and infer something different on appeal.

IV. The Trial Court did not Improperly Shift the Burden on an Affirmative
Defense Because the Eskelsens Never Demonstrated a Fraudulent Transfer.
In Point V of their brief, the Eskelsens argue that the trial court erred in shifting
the burden away from Theta on its good faith purchaser defense. (Br. 41-44.) That is not
true. This defense is available under the UFT A if the underlying transaction is voidable
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~

as a fraudulent transfer. See Utah Code Ann.§ 25-6-9(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2015). So if
a plaintiff can demonstrate a fraudulent transfer, the innocent third party purchaser can
keep the transaction intact by showing that it "took in good faith and for a reasonably
Qi)

equivalent value ... " Id. See also Butler, 740 P.2d at 1262 (explaining that conveyance
as to innocent third party "cannot be voided").
The Eskelsens never demonstrated a fraudulent transfer. Thus, the burden never
shifted to Theta on its affirmative defense. Indeed, as explained above, the trial court's
discussion and consideration of "reasonably equivalent value" was in determining
whether the underlying transaction was fraudulent in the first instance. It never found
that a fraudulent transfer actually occurred.
Nor did the trial court conclude, as the Eskelsens suggest, that what Theta paid
was reasonably equivalent value solely because the Eskelsens provided no evidence that
it was not. The trial court found that the value Theta paid was sufficient to satisfy the

(ii)

Hansens' debt. (R. 1125 if 34(g).) The Eskelsens submitted no competent evidence as a
counterweight to that value. In their brief, the Eskelsens remain defiant in refusing to
acknowledge the trial court's findings and instead argue that "the evidence suggests it
was not reasonably equivalent to the property interest's actual value." (Br. 43.) The
evidence "suggesting" this was Hansen's testimony which the trial deemed suspect and
gave no weight. The trial court committed no error on this issue.
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V.

The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in Denying the Eskelsens' Rule
52(b) Motion to Amend the Findings.

~

Finally, the Eskelsens argue that the trial court erred in denying their Rule 52(b)
motion to amend the findings. (Br. 44-46.) This argument fails for several reasons.
First, the Eskelsens have not provided the correct standard of review. Without any
analysis, they claim the standard is both clearly erroneous and correctness. (Br. 7.) 13 But
neither case they cite addresses review of a trial court's denial of a Rule 52(b) motion.
Their confusion is not surprising. Our research also did not reveal a Utah case directly
setting forth the standard of review for a Rule 52(b) motion. But all indicators point to an
abuse of discretion standard. That is the standard employed in reviewing motions under
Rule 59, which are typically brought in tandem with Rule 52(b) motions. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(b) ("The motion may accompany a motion for a new trial under Rule 59.");
Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, ,I 14, 173 P.3d 865 (explaining that standard of
review in the context of an appeal of a Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial is abuse of
discretion). Federal appellate courts also typically review the grant or denial of Rule
52(b) motions for abuse of discretion. See Matthews v. C.E. C. Indus. Corp., 202 F.3d
282 (10th Cir. 1999); Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 1998); Nat'!

13

Citing Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998) (stating clearly
erroneous standard of review for fact findings); State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431,433 (Utah
1993) (stating correctness standard of review for conclusions oflaw).
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(ij

Metal Finishing Co. v. BarclaysAmerican/Commercial, Inc., 899 F.2d 119, 125 (1st Cir.
1990). 14 This makes sense.
The purpose of a Rule 52(b) motion is to "raise questions of substance by seeking
reconsideration of material findings of fact or conclusions of law to prevent manifest
injustice or reflect newly discovered evidence." 9C Wright & Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure, § 2582 (3d ed.). It is not "to relitigate old issues, to advance new theories,
or to secure a rehearing on the merits." Fontenot v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 791 F.2d 1207,
1219 (5th Cir. 1986). Given that purpose, this Court should apply the abuse of discretion
standard recognizing that the trial court, fresh off of living through the trial, is best
positioned to evaluate and determine whether the motion raises a legitimate concern or
whether it seeks to reargue a lost point.
The Eskelsens have not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying their motion to amend. Rather, their Rule 52(b) motion was little more than
disagreement with the trial court's refusal to see the evidence their way. (R. 1142-44.)
Starting with Finding ,r 31, the Eskelsens claim that the trial court should not have
stopped in finding that "Tobler never gave Mr. Blanchard the Foreclosure Letter or the
signed agreements," but should also have found that Blanchard drafted those agreements
and remembered doing so. (Br. 44.) But as explained above (at 31 ), Blanchard had no
clear recollection: "It's possible I had forgotten. I think I remembered, but maybe I -

14

Because the state and federal versions of the rule are substantially similar, federal
authorities addressing Rule 52(b) are persuasive. See Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ,r 26,
11 P.3d 277.
45
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maybe I didn't." (R. 888 Trial Tr. 215:4-7.) Having listened to this testimony, the trial
court did not err in refusing to extend its finding. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936
(Utah 1994) (the trial court is "in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses
and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot
hope to gamer from a cold record").
The Eskelsens next quibble about Finding ,I 32, that "Tobler never discussed ...
Jennings' request for documents with Mr. Blanchard." They argue that the trial court
should have found that Blanchard did not recall any discussions. (Br. 45.) Blanchard
testified:
Q. Did Mr. Tobler ever tell you about a document request from Gilbert
Jennings?
A: No, I don't remember that.
Q: Did Mr. Tobler during these conversations in January, February and
March of 2011, did Mr. Tobler provide you with any documentary proof
that these interests - that the Hansens' interests were validly foreclosed on?
A: No. Again, we did not- that was not a heavy item of discussion.

(R. 884 Trial Tr. 211 :9-17). From hearing this testimony live and observing Blanchard
giving it, the trial court could reasonably infer and thus find that Blanchard did not
remember these conversations because they never happened.
The Eskelsens next assault Finding ,I 45, which fixes March 22, 2011 as the date
Blanchard informed Tobler to work directly with the Eskelsens and that he would not be
preparing any agreement. They contend that Tobler did not know this until May 4. (Br.
45.) This is of "paramount" concern, they say, because it "lulled" them into waiting for a
compromise. (Br. 46.) That's their take. Here's another. The March 22 email,
Blanchard told Tobler that "[i]f your clients don't hear from [Hansen] in the next day or
46
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so, please let me know." (Ex. 8.) Thus, Blanchard was waiting to hear something more
from the Eskelsens. He never did. As such, he testified that "he thought it was done and
resolved." (R. 885 Trial Tr. 212:9-20.) Tobler confirmed that he never got back with
Blanchard to advise him that the Eskelsens had not heard from the Hansens. (R. 728
Trial Tr. 55 :3-6.) From this, the trial court could reasonably infer and therefore find, as it
did, that as of March 22, the Eskelsens were to work directly with the Hansens and that
(/j

Blanchard would not be preparing any agreement unless he heard otherwise from Tobler.
He never did. Further, the Eskelsens' argument about being "lulled" into inaction by

Ci

Blanchard is simply false because the trial court found that the discussion with Blanchard
should have sparked them into action, not lulled them to sleep. (R. 1121 -22 iJ 25.)
A trial court does not err in denying a motion to amend findings that seeks "to

Ci

interpret the evidence according to plaintiffs theory of the case ... " L.A. Young Sons

Const. Co. v. Tooele County, 575 P.2d 1034, 1040 (Utah 1978). The trial court heard and
examined the evidence over the course of a two-day trial. It made and entered its
findings, conclusions, and judgment. It thereafter considered and rejected the Eskelsens'
motion to amend those findings. (R. 1241-1243.) The Eskelsens have not demonstrated
that this was an abuse of its discretion.
They don't even explain, in the context of all other unchallenged findings, what
difference it would make. Instead, they merely leave it to this Court to figure out,
arguing, "These incorrect findings potentially had a significant impact on the Court's
conclusions." (Br. 44) (Emphasis added.) That is not sufficient to discharge their burden
on appeal. See, e.g., Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (briefing requirements); Ortega v.
47
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Ridgewood Estates LLC, 2016 UT App 13 I, 125, 379 P.3d 18 (requiring briefs to contain
"reasoned analysis based on relevant legal authority"). The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to amend its findings. This Court should affinn.

CONCLUSION
This Com1 should affinn.
DA TED: April 24, 2017.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

~

Attorneys.for Appellee
Theta Investment Company
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Date _ _ _--..,,c;-w-.....,._

FIFTFfdrtrmcf· C

URT
WASHINGTON COUNTY

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT By _ _ _ _ __
IN AND FOR WASIDNGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHAD ESKELSEN and

LORNA ESKELSEN
Plaintiffs,
Qi

v.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

VAUGHN L. HANSEN; CAROLYN S.
HANSEN; VC HOLDINGS, LLC; THETA
INVESTMENT COMPANY

Trial Dates: March 30 & 31
(Bench Trial)

THETA INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Counter and Cross Claimant,
Case No. 120500400

V.

CHAD ESKELSEN and
LORNA ESKELSEN

Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox

Counterclaim Defendants,

VC HOLDINGS, LLC and VAUGHN
HANSEN
Cross-claim Defendants

This case came before the Court for a two day bench trial on March 30 and 31, 2015. At
the end of trial the Court took the matter under advisement and requested that the parties provide

proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and proposed judgments for the Courts further
consideration. Having reviewed the pleadings, trial notes, the proposed findings/conclusions
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and judgments, and for the reasons set forth below the Court hereby rules against the Plaintifrs
and in favor of Defendant Theta Investment Company.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On or about July 31, 2000, Gilbert M. Jennings (hereinafter "Mr. Jennings") formed
JENCO, LC (hereinafter "JENCO''), and was manager of the same. (See Ex. 22).
2. On or about January 6, 2005, Vaughn and Carolyn Hansen (hereinafter "the Hansens")
formed a company called VC Holdings, LLC (hereinafter ''VC Holdings,,) and filed Articles of
Organization with the Utah Department of Commerce. (See Ex. 26). In June of 2007, the
Hansens both became managers of VC Holdings. (See Ex. 52).
3. On June 28, 2007, the Hansens, as sole members ofVC Holdings, LLC, executed an
Amendment to the VC Holdings LLC Operating Agreement indicating that the Company was
managed by its managers, including Carolyn S. Hansen and Vaughn Hansen. (See Ex. 52).
4. On November 17, 2007, VC Holdings updated its official records with the State of
Utah Department of Commerce to indicate Vaughn Hansen was the Manager ofVC Holdings.
(See Ex. 38).

5. At some point the Hansens agreed to allow Vaughn Hansen to execute documents on
behalf ofVC Holdings as manager without another manager's signature. (See Tr. vol. II, 74:9-13
(Hansen)).
6. Mr. Hansen and Mr. Jennings have known each other for over 30 years, first meeting
when Mr. Hansen was only 12 years old, and have had ongoing business with each other for
many of those years. (Tr. Vol. I, 66:19-67:14 (Hansen)) Mr. Hansen also testified that he relied
on Mr. Jennings for financial and legal advice. (See Id. at 19: 15).
Page 2 of 28
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7. In 2007, the Hansens and Mr. Jennings agreed to have their companies, VC Holdings
and JENCO, purchase real property in the Fort Pierce Industrial Park, St. George, Utah.8. The
property, described as: ''Proposed Lot 158 Fort Pierce Industrial Park" was purchased in part by

each company on August 15, 2007. (See Ex. 14).
8. On March 24, 2008, VC Holdings and JENCO fonned JVC Leasing, LC (hereinafter
"NC Leasing"). Mr. Jennings was made manager. @.).

9. On June 9, 2008, VC Holdings and JENCO together transferred 100% of the Property
to NC Leasing, LC. (See Ex. 15).
IO. In return JENCO received a 68.2% interest in NC Leasing, and VC Holdings
received a 31.8% interest in NC Leasing. (See Ex. 25 p. 24).
11. On May 12, 2009, Chad and Loma Eskelsen (hereinafter "the Eskelsens") loaned the
Hansens $120,000.00, and the Hansens signed a Promissory Note regarding the same. (See Ex.
1).

12. As security for the loan, the Hansens executed a Limited Liability Company
Membership Interest Pledge Agreement pledging 100% of the totaled issued and outstanding

•

membership interests in VC Holdings to the Eskelsens. (See Ex. 2) .
13. VC Holdings was not a party to the Promissory Note. (See Ex. I).

14. In the summer of 2010, the Eskelsens hired an attorney, Daniel J. Tobler, to pursue
the Hansens for failing to repay the loan. (See Tr. Vol. I, 9:19-10: 14 (Tobler))
15. Mr. Tobler contacted Mr. Hansen and discussed the Hansens default. (Id. at I 0: 15-

23). They discussed the Hansens executing a confession of judgment in lieu of a lawsuit. Mr.
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Hansen agreed to the confession, but never followed through. (Id. at 10: 24-11: 10). Neither the
Eskelsens nor Mr. Tobler was able to contact the Hansens after these initial discussions. ( Id.).

l 6. On October 28, 20 I 0, the Eskelsens filed a UCC 1 Acknowledgment of Filing
Statement with the Utah Department of Commerce showing them as secured parties to 100% of
the membership interest in VC Holdings. (See Ex. 35).
17. On December 30, 2010, Mr. Tobler sent a letter dated December 27, 2010 to Vaughn
and Carolyn Hansen (the "Foreclosure Letter'l (See Ex. 17; see also Tr. vol. I, 16:1-8
(Tobler)).
18. The Foreclosure Letter stated that the Eskelsens were accepting the Hansens total
issued and outstanding membership interests in VC Holdings in full satisfaction of the Hansens
obligation to the Eskelsens. (Id).
19. The Foreclosure Letter also stated that, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated§ 48-2-c804(6)(c) and paragraph 5.IO(c) of the Operating Agreement ofVC Holdings, the Eskelsens were
removing the Hansens as managers of VC Holdings. (Id.).
20. The Foreclosure Letter also stated that the Hansens had 20 days after the letter was
sent to object to the Eskelsens ''proposal." (Id).
21. Although the Foreclosure Letter was sent via certified mail, no one signed indicating
receipt of the Foreclosure letter. (See Tr. vol. I, 18:4-25 (Court), 45: 16-24 (Tobler)).
22. Mr. Hansen testified that he did not see the Foreclosure Letter until long after the sale
of the Property occurred. (See Tr. vol. I, 88:17-24, 93:5-9, 120:7-21 (Hansen)).
23. On December 30, 2010, the Eskelsens attorney, Dan Tobler, sent a different letter to

JVC Leasing and Gilbert Jennings. (See Ex. 18).
Page 4 of 28
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24. Tobler's letter to NC Leasing stated that the "Eskelsens have elected to be admitted
as members ofVC Holdings, and are now managers of the same. Thus all notices from JVC
Leasing, LC, and payments or distributions for VC Holdings, LLC' s 31.8% interest in NC
Leasing, LC, shall be paid to the Eskelsens at the address listed below." (Id).
25. Tobler's letter to NC Leasing did not include a copy of the Foreclosure Letter or the
loan documents between the Eskelsens and Hansens. (See Tr. vol. I, 48:1-7 (Tobler)).
26. Tobler's letter to NC Leasing did not reference the 20-day objection period, nor did

it state that Vaughn Hansen would be removed as manager of VC Holdings. (See Ex. 18).
27. At the time Mr. Tobler sent the December 30, 2010 letter to JVC Leasing, Gilbert
Jennings knew nothing about the Eskelsens or their dealings with the Hansens. (See Tr. vol. I,
232: 6-10 (Jennings)).
ij)

28. On January 7,2011, Mr. Tobler received a phone call from attorney E. Troy
Blanchard of the law firm Durham Jones & Pinegar. (See Tr. Vol. I, 21:18-23; see also Ex 6).

Mr. Blanchard stated he was calling as a favor to the Hansens, but that his firm officially
represented Mr. Jennings. (Id.). Mr. Blanchard stated he did not believe the Eskelsens had
properly foreclosed the membership interest in VC Holdings (Id).; however, rather than dispute
this issue, he suggested a potential compromise to allow Mr. Hansen to broker a sale of the
subject property to Mr. Jennings (through one of his entities), place the proceeds in escrow, and
then the Hansens and Eskelsens could detennine how the proceeds should be distributed. Mr.
Tobler agreed to consult with the Eskelsens and then contact Mr. Blanchard with an answer. (Id.
at 28:4-9).
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29. Blanchard and Tobler began these discussions less than 20 days after Tobler sent the
~

Foreclosure Letter to the Hansens and before Tobler received the request for documents from
Gilbert Jennings. (See Ex. 17, see also Tr. vol. I, 51: 1-22, 21:18-23, 22:15-17 (Tobler)).
30. On January 11, 2011, Mr. Tobler received a letter from Mr. Jennings, dated January
4, 2011, on behalf of JVC Leasing in response to his letter dated December 27, 2011. (See Ex.
20; Tr. Vol.I, 21 :24-22:4 (Tobler)). In that letter, Mr. Jennings requested "documentary proof
of the transition of ownership" of VC Holdings. (See Ex. 20). Mr. Jennings also informed Mr.

Ci)

Tobler that VC Holdings was ~'indebted to the Company in the amount of $54,270.50," and
suggested that the Eskelsens "contact me and work out a repayment plan. (Id.).
31. Mr.Tobler never gave Mr. Blanchard the Foreclosure Letter or the signed agreements.
(See Tr. vol. I, 211: 12-17 (Blanchard), 46:7-13, 50:4-11 (Tobler)).

32. Mr. Tobler never discussed Gilbert Jennings' request for documents with Mr.
Blanchard. (See Tr. vol. I, 211 :9-11 (Blanchard)).
33. Mr. Tobler never provided documents to Mr. Blanchard in response to Gilbert

Jennings request. (See Tr. vol. I, 211: 12-17 (Blanchard), 50:4-11 (Tobler)).
34. Mr. Tobler testified after his phone call with Mr. Blanchard he believed he had made
official contact with both Mr. Jennings' law firm and unofficially with the Hansens' attorney,
(See Tr. Vol. I, 21 :24-22:4 (Tobler)), and that it would not be ethical for him to contact either
Hansen or Jennings directly. (Id. at 27: 5-11).
35. Mr. Jennings testified that he worked mostly with attorney Chris L. Engstrom also of
Durham Jones & Pinegar, and that Mr. Blanchard worked with him directly on at least two other
projects. Id. at 226: 17-12: 227: 7-15(Jennings)).

Mr. Blanchard also testified he had worked
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~

(i)

directly with Mr. Jennings in about early 2011. (Id. at 208: 20-209:8). Mr. Blanchard further
testified that he and Mr. Engstrom were both shareholders at Durham Jones & Pinegar. (Id. at
208: 20-209:8).
36. Mr. Tobler never responded to Mr. Jennings' request for documents. (See Tr. voL I,
50: 1-11 (Tobler); Tr. vol. II, 38: 14-24 (Jennings)).
37. After Mr. Jennings received Mr. Tobler's letter, Jennings specifically asked Mr.
Hansen about the Eskelsens' claims. Mr. Jennings testified that Mr. Hansen told him that he
(Hansen) was still the owner of VC Holdings. (See Tr. vol. I, 238:23 - 239:6 (Jennings)).
38. The Court believes that Mr. Hansen would make that statement to Mr. Jennings
~

because, as set forth below, he was desperate for money and had access to money if he was the
controlling manager ofVC Holdings, and could sell VC Holdings interest in NC Leasing.
39. After Mr. Jennings received Mr. Tobler's letter, Jennings searched the State of
Utah's Department of Commerce records (i.e. its website)and found that Mr. Hansen was still
listed as Manager of VC Holdings. (See Tr. vol. I, 239:2-5 (Jennings)).
40. The purpose of the discussion between Blanchard and Tobler was to potentially
arrange an escrow agreement to place any funds or distributions from NC Leasing in escrow for
the purpose of paying Hansens' debt to the Eskelsens'. (See Tr. vol. I, 182: 10-15 (Blanchard)).
41. On January 19, 2011, Mr. Tobler contacted Mr. Blanchard to inform him that the
Eskelsens would agree to the proposed escrow agreement. (Id. at 31: 7-14). Mr. Tobler

'i)

understood that all sides, the Eskelsens, the Hansens, and Mr. Jenningst would agree to and sign
the agreement. (Id.) Mr. Blanchard also testified this was his understanding. (See Id. At 194:21-

195:3 (Blanchard)).
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42. On February 22, 2011, Mr. Blanchard sent an email to Mr. Tobler stating: ''I
apologize for the delay in getting back to you. It is not Vaughn's fault, but mine as I have not
gotten to the Escrow Agreement yet. I will put together a draft this week and get it to you. I will
also contact the Jennings to confinn they will agree to the escrow of funds to the extent of any
distribution pursuant to the escrow agreement." (See Ex. 7). Mr. Blanchard testified that when
he wrote that he would "contact the Jennings" he meant he would talk to Mr. Engstrom. (See Tr.
Vol. I, 200: 111-l 7(Blanchard)).
43. Mr. Blanchard also testified that he told Mr. Tobler that he would either consult with
Mr. Jennings or Mr. Engstrom about the escrow agreement to ensure it was acceptable to the
Jennings. (Id. at 189: 7-13).
44. Mr. Blanchard testified that he had a conversation with Mr. Engstrom about the
escrow agreement and the Jennings would not have a problem with it. (Id. at 189: 7-13). Mr.

~

B]anchard also testified that he informed Mr. Tobler that the Hansens and Mr, Jennings were on
board with an agreement. (Id. at 193: 15-22).
(ii

45. Approximately one month later on March 22, 2011, Mr. Blanchard informed Mr.

Tobler that Hansen wanted to work directly with the Eskelsens and that he (Mr. Blanchard)
would not be preparing an agreement. (See Ex. 8 & 9).
46. Mr Blanchard further informed Mr. Tobler that he (Mr. Tobler) should contact
Blanchard if the Eskelsens did not hear from Hansen in the next day or so. (See Tr. vol. I, 55:3-6
(Tobler); 212: 13-20 (Blanchard)).

Page 8 of 28

1108
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

47. Mr. Blanchard also infonned Mr. Tobler that "[n]o distributions are being paid out
of the LLC, and haven't been for a Jong time, and it's unlikely distribution will be made for the
foreseeable future." (See Ex. 8).
48. Mr. Blanchard testified that when he sent these emails on March 22, 2011, he did not
know there was any plan between the Hansens and Mr. Jennings to sell the property interest at
issue in this case. See March 30, 2015, (1501) Audio at 36:15.

Mr. Tobler also testified that he did not understand these emails to mean the property might be
sold. (See Tr. Vol. I, 202:23-203:S(Blanchard)).
49. Because of financial difficulties the Hansen had been trying to sell their interest in

the Property during 2010. (See Tr. vol. I, 98:8-13 (Hansen), Tr. vol. II, 33:1-5 (Jennings)).
50. Mr. Hansen testified that he received an offer on the property sometime in the
~

summer or fall of 2010, but the offer never materialized. (See Tr. vol. II, 33:6-21 (Jennings)).
51. In a further attempt to alleviate their financial difficulties, Mr. Hansen asked, on
behalf of VC Holdings, to receive distributions from JVC Leasing, but Mr. Jennings as the
majority owner (through Theta) of JVC Leasing overruled his request and elected instead to build
a reserve fund. (See Tr. Vil. I, 111: 10-16(Hansen)).
52. Hansen also approached Mr. Jennings and offered to sell VC Holdings interest JVC

Leasing to Mr. Jennings or one of his entities. (See Tr. vol. II, 10:21-24 (Jennings), Tr. vol. I,
100:21-23 (Hansen)).
53. Because of the state of the economy in St. George at that time, Mr. Jennings was not
very interested in Mr. Hansen's proposal. But in an attempt to help the Hansens, Mr. Jennings
decided to consider the Hansens' offer. (See Tr. vol. II, 47:10-12).
(iD

Page 9of 28

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1109

54. Between January and March of 2011, Mr. Jennings testified he had multiple meetings
with Mr. Engstrom and the Eskelsens were discussed in those meetings. (See Tr. Vol. I> 237:1024: Vol. II, 18:23-19:10 (Jennings)).

55. Although Mr. Jennings testified he did not send a second letter or attempted to
contact the Eskelsens or call Mr. Tobler directly, (See Tr. Vol. II, 8:2-228 (Jennings)), he also
testified he had "exhausted everything I knew what do to do" to discover if the Eskelsens had a
valid claim. (See Tr. Vol. I, 241: 7-8 (Jennings)).

56. Ultimately, some three months after Mr. Jennings received Mr. Tobler's letter
regarding the Eskelsens' claims and having heard nothing more about them, Mr. Jennings and
the Hansens agreed to the sale and purchase and ofVC Holdings ownership interest in NC
Leasing, by Theta for a sales price of$236,337.00. The sale was accomplished by a somewhat
complicated process involving a l 031 property exchange.
57. Prior to the sale, Mr. Hansen testified he asked Mr. Jennings specifically ifhe had
authority to conduct business on behalf ofVC Holdings. (See Tr. Vol. I, 104:8-10; 135:22136:S(Hansen)). He stated Mr. Jennings told him the Eskelsens' claim was not valid. (Id. at

105: 5-10). Mr. Hansen stated he would not have participated in the transaction if Mr. Jennings
had told him it was not legal. (Id. at 105: 11-15).

Ci)

58. Conversely, Mr. Jennings testified it was Mr. Hansen who told him the Eskelsens did
not have a valid claim, (Id. at 249: 4-?(Jennings)) and that he and Mr. Hansen had several
conversations about the Eskelsens between January and March 2011. (See Tr. Vol. II, 7: 31l(Jennings)).

Page 10 of 28

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1110

59. Both Plaintiff and the Jennings Defendants subpoenaed Vaughan Hansen for the trial.

He testified at length for and against each side. After witnessing his demeanor on the witness
stand and hearing his testimony this Court finds much of his testimony to be suspect and selfserving.
60. The Court does not believe that Mr. Hansen asked Mr. Jennings if he had authority to
conduct business on behalf of VC Holdings, and that Mr. Jennings replied that the Eskelsen's
claims were not valid.
61. This Court does not believe that Mr. Hansen would have done anything to stop the
sale, especially questioning his own authority to act on behalf ofVC Holdings by asking Mr.
Jennings for his opinion regarding the same.
62. It was Mr. Hansen who approached Mr. Jennings and offered to sell the Property.
63. The Hansens were desperate for money and a ready source of money was the sale of
VC Holdings interest in JVC Leasing. The only way that interest could be sold was if Hansen, as
the manager of VC Holdings, signed the necessary documents on behalf of VC Holdings.
64. The Court finds that the Hansens bankruptcy filings (described below) contain
inaccuracies and untruths, and that Mr. Hansen testified falsely under oath in October 2011, at
the 341 Bankruptcy hearing, all of which further convinces the Court that much of Mr.
Hansen's testimony is not believable.
65. The Court finds, on the other hand, that Mr. Jennings testimony on this point
believable. He had no reason to give Mr. Hansen legal or business advice regarding the sale of
the property. Mr. Hansen was the party pushing the sale, not Mr. Jennings, and it makes sense
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that Mr, Hansen would be giving Mr. Jennings assurances that he was the manager of VC
@t)

Holdings and could act on behalf ofVC Holdings.
66. The Court finds that but for Mr. Hansen's assurances to Mr. Jennings that he could
act on behalf of VC Holdings, Theta would probably not have purchased the Property from VC
Holdings in March of 2011.
67. On March 23, 2011, Mr. Engstrom ordered closing documents from Elwin Prince at
Southern Utah Title Company for a transfer of the 31.8% property interest at issue in this case
from JVC Leasing to VC Holdings and then to Theta Investment Company (hereinafter "Theta
Investment") through a 1031 exchange qualified intermediary. (See Ex. 5).
68. On March 29,2011, Mr. Hansen, acting as Manager ofVC Holdings, signed a
Purchase Agreement agreeing to sell the Property to Theta for $236,337.00. (See Ex. 10).
69. On March 29, 2011, Mr. Hansen, signing as Manager ofVC Holdings, executed an
Agreement to Redeem Membership Interest by which VC Holdings exchanged its 31.8%
membership interest for a 31.8% interest in the Property. (See Ex. 39).
70. Pursuant to the Agreement to Redeem Membership Interest, JVC Leasing transferred
a 31.8% interest in the Property to VC Holdings. (See Ex. 16).
71. In exchange for the purchase price, VC Holdings transferred its 31.8% interest in the
Property to Theta. (See Ex. 21 ).
72. The March 29, 2011, transaction took place at the office of Southern Utah Title
Company. (See Tr. vol. II 49:10~12 (Jennings); Tr. vol. I, 117:25 - 118:7 (Hansen); Tr. vol. I,
146:9-12 (Prince)).
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73. On March 29, 2011 the Hansens did not have a personal ownership interest in NC
Leasing. (See Tr. vol. II, 31:7-14).
74. In exchange for the transfer of JVC .Leasing's interest, Theta paid$ I 80,000.00 into
escrow with Southern Utah Title Company, and satisfied the debt Mr. Jennings described in his
letter to Mr. Tobler. (Ex. 20). The $180,000.00 would have satisfied the debt owed by the
Hansens to the Eskelsens.
75. Mr. Hansen testified there was no appraisal of the property interest at the time of

sale, (See Tr. Vol. I, 116:2-6 (Hansen)) and he believed the value was much higher at
approximately $350,000.00. (Id. at 137:8-11) Further, be does not believe the purchase price
was for fair market value. ( Id. at 138: 8-11).
76. Mr. Hansen testified he sold the property interest on March 29, 2011, because he was
"broke." (Id. at 100: 17-20 (Hansen)) Mr. Jennings also testified he knew the Hansens were in

financial trouble. (See Id. at 244:1-2; Vol. II, 5:18 9Jenniings)).
77. Mr. Hansen testified the final sale price was determined by Mr. Jennings who
exploited his and his wife's poor financial situation, forcing them to sell only to Mr. Jennings or
one of his companies. (See Tr. Vol. l,101:24-102:3(Hansen)) Mr. Hansen testified he had
another opportunity to sell the property for $350,000.00, (Id. at 101 :6-7); however, Mr. Jennings
told him "we will not have any other partner, do you understand what I am saying." (Id. at I 02:
8-12). After this conversation Mr. Hansen testified he felt he could not sell to anyone else. (Id.;
~

see also 142:23-143:1, 14-20).
78. At the March 29,201 I, closing Mr. Hansen signed a Waiver and Consent
acknowledging the law firm of Durham Jones & Pinegar did not represent him or VC Holdings
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in the transaction with NC Leasing and/or JENCO, although the firm had represented Mr.
Hansen and VC Holdings in other matters. ( See Ex. 55).
79. At the March, 29, 2011, closing Mr. Hansen instructed Southern Utah Title Company
to release the $180,000.00 sale proceeds to a company called ME Jenkins Management, LLC.
(See Exs. 51, 34). Once paid out, Mr. Hansen testified he used the money for personal expenses
and elected not to pay the Eskelsens. (See Tr. Vol. I, 127:6-11, 127:24-128:1 (Hansen)). He
stated that he "decided to do something he thought was wrong and kept it for himself." (Id. at
128:8-10).
80. As of March 29, 2011, the Eskelsens had not filed a change with the Utah Division
~

of Commerce to reflect that they were the owners and managers of VC Holdings and that the
Hansens were no longer members or managers. (See Ex. 53). Mr. Tobler testified they did not
do this because they were in negotiations with the Hansens and Mr. Jennings and therefore did
not believe it was necessary. (See Tr. Vol.I, 38:20-39:7, 14-25(Tobler)). Further, Mr. Tobler
testified he believed the easiest or most proper way to change the website would be to get a
resolution reflecting the change from the Hansens. (Id at 128:8-10).
81. Mr. Tobler testified that neither he nor the Eskelsens had any knowledge of the
March 29, 2011, transaction. In fact, on May 4, 2011, he contacted Mr. Blanchard to inquire the
status of the parties and the escrow agreement. (Id. at 41: 2-10). At that time he said Mr.
Blanchard informed him that he had not had contact with Mr. Hansen for a very long time and
because of that there would be no agreement between the parties. ( Id. 35: 2-36:7). Mr.
Blanchard also told Mr. Tobler he was free to contact or otherwise pursue the Hansens. (Id.).
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82. Mr. Tobler further testified that other than Mr. Blanchard, no other attorneys from
Durham Jones & Pinegar or Mr. Jennings contacted him between January and March. {Id. at 36:

19-22).
83. After May 4, 201 I,The Eskelsens unsuccessfully attempted to locate the Hansens.
(Id. at 37: 4-16). They even hired a process server to try to find them still with no success. (Id.}
84. In August of20I l, the Eskelsens received notice of the Hansens' Ch. 7 bankruptcy
filing. (See Ex. 29: Tr. Vol. I, 40:14-17 Tobler)). On the same day they received the bankruptcy
notice, Mr. Tobler testified he searched the Washington County, Utah, Recorder,s Office website
and first discovered the March 29, 2011, transfer documents. (Id. at 41:2-10).
85. Mr. Tobler reviewed the Hansens' bankruptcy schedules and discovered that the
Eskelsens were listed as unsecured creditors. (See Tr. vol. I, 59: 9-16 (Tobler), 130:11-17

ti

(Hansen); see also Trial Exhibit 29 pp. 9, 16).
86. Hansens bankruptcy schedules did not list any interest in businesses.
(See Ex. 29 p. 5).

87. Hansens bankruptcy schedules did not list any transfer of property from Hansen to
the Eskelsens or anyone else. (See Ex. 29 p. 34).
88. The Eskelsens did not file any objections to any documents filed in the Hansens'
bankruptcy case. (See Tr. Vol. I, 58:13-15 (Tobler)).
89. A 341 meeting of creditors was held in October of201 I. (See Ex. 30). The
~

Eskelsens and Mr. Tobler attended to ask questions about the March 29, 2011, transaction. Id.;
Tr. Vol. I, 42:12-20 (Tobler)). At the meeting, the bankruptcy trustee, David West, asked
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questions first and specifically asked about the property interest and the transaction. (Id. at 43:921). The Eskelsens, then asked several more questions about the transaction. (Id. at 42:12-20).
90. At the Hansens bankruptcy meeting of Creditors, Hansen did not tell the bankruptcy
Trustee about the $180,000.00 he received from VC Holdings/ME. Jenkins at the March 29,
2011 closing, and he falsely informed the Trustee that he only received forgiveness of debt. (See

Tr. Vol. I, 129:5-16 (Hansen), 59:4-6 (Tobler)).
91. The Hansens received a bankruptcy discharge in December of 2011. (See Ex. 31 ).
However, only Chad Eskelsen, not Loma Eskelsen, was listed as a creditor in the bankruptcy.
(See Ex. 29).

92. Shortly thereafter Mr. Tobler, contacted the Utah Department of Commerce about
changing the state's website to reflect the change in managers of VC Holdings. (See Tr. Vol.
40:7-13). He was told Utah is a good faith filing state, meaning he could just simply change the

~

information without any formality. (Id.). This change was accomplished on February 29, 2012.

(See Ex. 38).
93. The Eskelsens did not file any objection to Hansen's bankruptcy discharge. (See Tr.

Vol. I, 58:17-19 (Tobler)).
94. The Eskelsens thereafter filed this lawsuit on JW1e 29, 2012, and on the same date

®}

filed a Notice of Lis Pendens on the property. The Court notes that the Eskelsens named their
own Company (VC Holdings) as a Defendant in this action.
95. VC Holdings did not file an Answer to the Eskelsens' complaint. But Plaintifrs
counsel filed an answer on behalf ofVC Holdings to Theta's cross complaint. It did not
otherwise participate or present a defense at trial.
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97. The Hansens were served with the Complaint and Cross Claim in this case, but they
did not file any response.
Based on the above Findings the Court now enters the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Hansens failed to answer the Plaintiffs' Complaint and Theta's cross claim, and
are in default, but any facts established against the Hansens by default are not binding and are not
(jj

deemed admitted as against Theta or the Eskelsens. 1 The Court will sign a separate judgment
regarding the same.

I. THE MARCH 29, 2011 TRANSFER WAS NOT A FRAUDULENT TRANSFER.
2. The Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that VC Holdings is the lawful owner of
31.8% of the Property. The first legal theory advanced in the Plaintiffs complaint is that the
transfer of the Property from VC Holdings to Theta on March 29, 2011 was a fraudulent transfer
under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act ("the Act'').
3. In order to prevail on a fraudulent transfer theory the Plaintiffs must establish that they
are "Creditors" and that the Hansens and/or VC Holdings are "Debtors".
4. There is no issue that the Hansens are "Debtors" under the Act. The Hansens
individually borrowed $120,000.00 from the Eskelsens. Thus a Debtor/Creditor relationship was
established.

1

<iJ

See Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69149; Dade County v. Lambert, 334 So. 2d 844, 847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976); Chromacolour Labs, Inc. v. Snider Bros. Prop. Mgmt. Inc., 503 A.2d 1365, 1369-70 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1986); Rogers v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 23, 27-28 (Mich. 2002); Archacki v.
Regional Transit Authority, 455 N.E.2d 1285, 1286 (Ohio 1983) (percuriam); Stillwell v. City of
Wheelingt 558 S.E.2d 598, 606-07 (W. Va. 2001).
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5. The situation with VC Holdings, however, is different. VC Holdings was not a party
to the Eskelsen/Hansen loan. VC Holdings did not owe a debt to the Eskelsens and is therefore
not a "Debtor" as defined by the Act. Therefore, The Eskelsens' fraudulent transfer claims
against VC Holdings fails.

~

6. As to the Hansens, the Eskelsens must also establish that the Hansens made a transfer

with either" (a) actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud [the Eskelsens]" or "(b) without
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer, ...etc. Paraphrasing Utah
Code § 25-6-5(1 ).
7. NC Leasing was the owner of the Property, not the Hansens. VC Holdings owned an
~

interest in NC Leasing, and its (VC Holdings) interest in JVC Leasing was transferred at the
March 29, 2011 closing. Because the Hansens did not own an interest in NC Leasing, they
could not and did not transfer any interest in JVC Leasing at the March 29, 2015 closing.

Therefore the Eskelsens' Fraudulent Transfer claims against the Hansens fail.
8. Even if the Hansens and VC Holdings interests can somehow be melded together so as
to become a "Debtor" Plaintiffs claims fails because they provided no evidence that VC
Holdings did not receive a "reasonably equivalent value " in exchange for the transfer" UCA Sec.

25-6-5(1).

9. VC Holdings received $236,337 from Theta in exchange for VC Holdings ownership
interest in NC Leasing. Mr, Hansen opined that VC Holding's interest in NC Leasing was worth
more than the $236,337.00. However, Mr. Hansen was not an owner or member of NC Leasing at
the time of the sale, and not being qualified as an expert regarding the value of limited liability
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company ownership interests, his opinion is suspect, and this Court gives no weight to his
testimony regarding value.
10. The Eskelsens' offered no other proof (such as an expert) to establish the fair market
value of the 31.8% ownership interest in NC Leasing's at the time of transfer.

They have failed

to establish an element required under the Act, and their cause of action fails. See Utah Code § 256-5(1 ).
11. Based on the above analysis, the Court has no need to further consider the parties other
arguments regarding Act.

II. MR. HANSEN WAS THE MANAGER OF VC HOLDINGS ON MARCH 29, 2011.
12. The Plaintiffs second argument in support of their request for a declaratory judgment is
that Hansen lacked the authority to sign the closing documents on behalf ofVC Holdings on March

Ci

29,201 l.

13. The Eskelsen's claim that after the Hansens default, they properly foreclosed on the
Hansens member interests in VC Holdings pursuant to Utah Code § 70A-9a-620. The Court agrees.
The security agreement (Ex. 2) was properly foreclosed and the Eskelsens obtained the ownership
interests ofVC Holdings.
14. The Eskelsens assert that when they obtained the ownership interests ofVC
Holdings, they removed the Hansens as managers and placed themselves in that position. From that
time on (sometime towards the end of January 2011) they claim the Hansens were no longer
~

managers of VC Holdings and could not act on behalf of the company. (See Exs. 17 & 18). The
Court disagrees with this assertion.

iJ
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15. As set forth below the Court concludes that even though the Eskelsens obtained VC
Holdings membership interests through foreclosure they did not become Managers of the Company

until long after the March 29, 20 I 1 closing.
16. A limited liability company is a separate entity managed by its members and/or
managers pursuant to an Operating Agreement. VC Holdings Operating Agreement (Ex. 40) sets

forth how the company will be owned, operated and managed.
17. Article 3 of the Operating Agreement sets forth the manner of acting ofif's members.
18. The Eskelsens did not comply with Article 3 by ever calling or holding a members
meeting setting forth their membership interests in the Company prior to the March 29, 2011 closing.
No minutes showing such meetings were ever produced. No such written Resolutions were
produced.
19. Section 3.4 Limitation on Individual Authority, of Article 3 states in pertinent part as
follows: ~'A Member who is not also a Manager has no authority to bind the Company."
20. Article 5 of the Operating Agreement describes Management of the Company and the
(j)

manner of acting of its managers. The Eskelsens did not comply with Article 5 by holding a
management meeting to vote themselves in as Managers, nor did they vote Mr. Hansen out as
Manager. No minutes showing such meetings were ever produced. No such written Resolutions
were produced.
21. The Court concludes that when the Foreclosure letter (Ex. 17) was written the

Eskelsens were not Managers of the Company and as members only they had no authority to bind
the Company.
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22. Article: 8.l(a) Required Amendments of the Operating Agreement also has bearing
on this issue. It specifically states: "The Company, the Manager and the Members will execute and
Qi

file with the Division a certificate of amendment of the Articles when... (6) there is a change in the

identity of any Manager...." (See Ex. 40)
23. The Eskelsens failed to file this required amendment with the Division showing that

they were now Managers of the Company prior March 29, 2015. This further supports the Courts
conclusion that they were not Managers at the time the Property was transferred.
24. It is unclear whether the Eskelsens had a copy of the Operating Agreement prior to the
March 29, 2011 closing date. 2 Whether the Eskelsens' did or did not have a copy of the Operating
agreement while not crucial, emphasizes the Court's conclusion that while they had properly
@

foreclosed on their security interest in the membership interests ofVC Holdings, they had not taken
control of the Company by the closing date.
25. During the January and February 2011 discussions between Mr. Blanchard and Mr.

~

Tobler, Mr. Blanchard indicated that the Hansens did not believe that the Eskelsens had properly
foreclosed the Hansens membership interest in VC Holdings. Based on the Hansens skepticism, the
~

Eskelsens were put on notice that they needed to take furhter corporate steps to show that they were
in control of the Company.

There are any number of things they could have done including having

a documented member meeting where they removed the Hansens as Managers; voted themselves in
as new managers; and, if they did not have access to the Operating Agreement they could have
2

The Foreclosure Letter (Ex. 17) does, however, refer to paragraph 5. I 0(c) of the Operating
Agreement.
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created and approved a whole new Operating Agreement. They also should have updated the state

records to put the world on notice that they were now the members and managers of VC Holdings.
26. The Eskelsens argue that updating the Utah Division of Commerce website to show
that Mr. Hansen had been removed as Manager, and showing the Eskelsens as the new Managers
would somehow not be reliable because Utah is a good faith filing state, meaning virtually anything
can be filed by anyone at any time. That argument, however, does not excuse them from filing
amended Articles, "showing a change in the identity of the Managers" pursuant to paragraph 8.l(a)

of the Operating Agreement. Furthermore, had they updated the Division's website prior to March
29, 2015, that simple act, in and of itself, would probably have obviated the need for this trial.
27. Updating the Division's website would have provided part of the additional proof that

Mr. Jennings requested in his January 4, 2011 letter to Mr. Tobler. (Ex20). Mr. Jennings testified
that after receiving Mr. Tobler's December 27,201 I letter (Ex. 18) he checked the Divisions

website, and found that Mr. Hansen was listed as Manager.
28. Furthermore, such an update would also have put Southern Utah Title on notice that
the Eskelsens claimed that Mr. Hansen was no longer the Manager of VC Holdings.

Southern

Utah Title Company searched that website in preparation for the March 29, 2011 closing, and found
that Mr. Hansen was listed as the Manager ofVC Holdings. If its search instead found that Mr.
Hansen was no longer listed as manager ofVC Holdings, Southern Utah Title would have notified
counsel for the Jennings and Mr. Hansen of it's web search, which this Court believes would have
also stopped the closing until the Eskelsens claims had been resolved.
~
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29. Because the Eskelsens, as new members ofVC Holdings, did not properly remove

Mr. Hansen as the manager ofVC Holdings; did not file a certificate of amendment pursuant to
Ci

paragraph 8.l(a) of the Operating Agreement; and, did not update the Division's website prior to the
March 29, 2011 closing, the Court concludes that Mr. Hansen, not the Eskelsens, was the Manager
ofVC Holdings on March 29, 2011.

(j

III. HANSENS ACTIONS AS MANAGER BINDS VC HOLDINGS
30. The Plaintiffs also claim that the March 29, 2011 transfers were voidable because
Hansen lacked the required authority to sign the closing documents.
31. Theta argues this claim fails if Theta was a bona fide purchaser. The Eskelsens

respond that Mr. Jennings was on inquiry notice and therefore Theta could not be bonafide
purchaser.
32. A bona fide purchaser is one who pays valuable consideration for a conveyancet acts
in good faith, and takes without notice of an adverse claim of others' outstanding rights to the
seller's title. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1197 (Utah 1993).
33. The Eskelsens cite the Court to the following case law defining inquiry notice. See
Universal C.l.T. Cor.p. v. Courtesy Motors. Inc., 333 P.2d 628,629 (1959) ("Whatever is notice
enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything
to which such inquiry might have led. When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a
@

fact, he shall be deemed conversant of it."); and O'Rei11y v. McLean, 37 P.2d 770, 775 (1934)
("Having sufficient information to put it upon inquiry, it was intervener's duty to make such
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investigation and it is charged with the knowledge which it would have thus obtained."); Pender v.
Dowse, 265 P.2d 644,649 (1954) ("Moreover, the inquiry must be made at a reliable source from
which the true state of facts will be naturally disclosed; it is not sufficient that the purchaser make an
inquiry of a person when he knows that it is to such person s interest to misrepresent or conceal the
1

existence of the outstanding interest, and that such person does deny its existence."); see also Meyer
v. Gen. Am. Cor.p., 569 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Utah 1977) ("It is notice, not knowledge, that the
purchaser must have, and it need not be actual notice constructive notice is sufficient to defeat the
purchaser's claim. Constructive notice can occur when circumstances arise that should put a
reasonable person on guard so as to require further inquiry on his part.").
34. The Court concludes that Mr. Jennings was put on notice of the Eskelsens claims upon
receipt of Mr. Tobleres December 27, 2010 letter. (Ex. 18), and that he had a duty to inquire about
the Eskelsens claims. The Court further concludes that Mr. Jennings did conduct a reasonable
inquiry into the Eskelsens claims. This conclusion is based on the following;

iJ

a.

Immediately upon receipt of Mr. Tobler's December 27, 2010 letter (Ex. 20) Mr.
Jennings wrote back to Mr. Tobler and asked for "documentary proof of the
transition of ownership." (See Ex. 20). The Eskelsens never responded to that
request.

b.

Mr. Jennings also asked Mr. Hansen about the Eskelsens claims and Mr. Hansen
told Mr. Jennings that he had authority to sign for VC Holdings;

c.

Mr. Jennings also researched the Commerce Divisions web site which listed
Mr. Hansen as Manager for VC Holdings. That information supported Mr.
Hansen's assertions that Mr. Hansen was the Manager ofVC Holdings;

d.

Theta conducted the closing at Southern Utah Title Company and obtained a title
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commitment that did not show any encumbrances to NC Leasings interest in the
Property.

~

@

e.

Mr. Jennings relied on representations and documents signed by Vaughn Hansen
to determine that Hansen had authority to execute the closing documents.

f.

Mr. Jennings relied on Southern Utah Title Company's determination that
Vaughn Hansen had authority to execute the closing documents.

g.

Theta Investment Company paid sufficient value to VC Holdings for Hansen to
pay his debts.

h.

Jennings and Troy Blanchard separately believed that Hansen intended to pay the
debts he had.

~

L

At one point there was a understanding that any proceeds received by VC
Holdings from the sale or distribution of or from JVC Leasing would be
escrowed for the benefit of the Eskelsens, and that Mr. Blanchard would prepare
an escrow agreement to that effect. If Mr. Jennings is deemed to know what Mr.
Blanchard knew, he would know that Mr. Blanchard contacted Mr. Tobler in
March and informed him (Mr. Tobler) that Mr. Hansen wanted to work directly
with the Eskelsens and that he (Mr. Blanchard) would not be preparing an escrow
agreement. (See Findings 44 &45 supra).

35. The Eskelsens argue that even though Mr. Jennings had not heard back from the
Eskelsens after he requested proof of their claims he should have contacted them again, a second
time, to ask for the information he had requested on January 7, 2011. The Court disagrees with that
argument. The ball, so to speak, was in the Eskelsens court and they had the duty to provide the
infonnation Mr. Jennings had requested some three months before the March 29, 2011 closing.
36. This Court has already concluded that Mr. Hansen was the Manager ofVC Holdings
on March 29, 2011. There is, however, an issue as to whether or not he exceeded his authority when
he signed the March 29, 2011 closing documents on behalf of VC Holdings.
Qi)

Page 25 of 28

~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1125

(ii

37. An act of a manager, including the signing of a document in the company name, for
apparently carrying on in the ordinary course of the company business, ... binds the company unless
the manager had no authority to act for the company in the particular matter and the lack of
authority was expressly described in the articles of organization or the person with whom the
manager was dealing knew or otherwise had notice that the manager laeked authority. UTAH
CODE ANN.§

48-2c-802(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2010). 3 (Emphasis added).

38. VC Holdings Articles of Organization contains no express language limiting Mr.

Hansen's authority, ac; Manager, to transfer VC Holdings assets. (See Ex. 26).
39. Paragraph 5.4 ofVC Holdings Operating Agreement (Ex. 40), however, contains the
following prohibition:
5.4 Required Member Approval. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Agreement, without the approval of Members whose aggregate Membership interest in
at least 51 percent, the Managers may take no action with respect to: the sale, lease,

exchange, mortgage, pledge or other disposition of all or substantially all of the
Company's assets; ...
40. The issue then is whether Mr. Jennings knew that Mr. Hansen had to have VC
Holding's members approval before participating in the March 29, 2011 closing.
41. Plaintiff's presented no evidence at trial regarding this issue and the Court concludes
3

As noted in Zions Gale R. V. Resort, llC v. Oliphant, 326 P.3d 118, 122 -123 (Utah App. 2014), "Apparent
authority exists where the conduct of the principal causes a third party to reasonably believe that someone has
authority to act on the principal's behalf, and the third party relies on this appearance of authority and will suffer loss
if an agency relationship is not found." Hale v. Big H Constr., Inc., 2012 UT App 283,164,288 P.3d 1046.
However. "[k]nowledge of an agent's lack of authority defeats a claim for apparent authority."Horrocks v. Westfalia
Systemat, 892 P.2d 14, 16 n. 1 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 166 (1958) ("A person
with notice of a limitation of an agent's authority cannot subject the principal to liability upon a transaction with the
agent ifhe should know that the agent is acting improperly.")).
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(ii

that the Mr. Jennings had no knowledge thereof.
42. Paragraph 5.5 of the Operating Agreement supports this conclusion. It states as

follows:

5.5 Agency Power and Authority. A Manager apparently acting for the Company in the
usual course of its business has the power to bind the Company and no person has an
obligation to inquire into the Manager's actual authority to act on the Company's
behalf. However, if a Manager acts outside the scope of the Manager's actual authority,
the Manager will indemnify the Company for and costs of damages it incurs as a result of
the unauthorized act. (Emphasis added).
43. The Hansens both signed a Resolution of Members authorizing the sale ofVC Holding's
interest in its ownership interest in JVC Leasing. (See Ex. 51).

44. Even though the Hansen~s were not members ofVC Holdings on March 29, 2011, no
evidence was produced at trial that Mr. Jennings was aware of that fact. And because Mr. Jennings
had known and done business with Mr. Hansens, and VC Holdings for years, the Court concludes
that Mr. Jennings had no obligation to make further inquires regarding member approval as to Mr.
Hansen's authority as manager to act for VC Holdings at the March 29, 2011 closing.
45. The Court concludes that because Mr. Hansen was the Manager ofVC Holdings, and that
Theta was a Bonafide Purchaser for Value on March 29, 2011, the Eskelsens claim that Mr. Hansen
lacked authority on March 29, 2011, to act on behalf ofVC Holdings fails.
46. Based on the above analysis the Court has no need to address the other arguments made
by the parties at trial.

47. Judgment should issue in favor of Theta, and the Lis Pendens recorded by the Eskelsens
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on the Property as part ofthis litigation should immediately be released.

Dated this

f

J Tk day of May, 2015.
BY THE COURT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions ofLaw to be placed in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this ~ day of May,
2015 to the following:

Vaughn Hansen and Carolyn Hansen
2615 W Highway 89
Mount Cannel, UT 84775
and e-mailed to the following:
Daniel J. Tobler
Attorney for Chad and Lorna Eskelsen and
VC Holdings, LLC
dtobler@slemboski-law.com

~

Bryan J. Pattison
John R. Berger
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant
Theta Investment Company
bpattison@djplaw.com
jberger@djplaw.com
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SL.El\'I.BOSKJ & TOBLER
DANIEL J. TOBLER #12695
Attorney for Plaintiffs
32 East I 00 South, Suite 203
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 628-1435

Facsimile: (435) 628-1489
Email: dtobler@slemboskilaw.com

IN TH.E FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHAD ESKELSEN and LORNA
ESKELSEN
)

Plaintiffs,
vs.

VAUGHN L. HANSEN;

CAROLYN S. HANSEN;
VC HOLDINGS, LLC, a Utah Limited
Liability Company; and
THETA INVESTMENT COMPANY, a

ORDER ON MOTION TO
AMEND AND l\.1AKE
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF
FACT and MOTION TO
EXTEND TIME TO SERVE
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS ON

PLAINTIFFS

Utah Corporation.

Defendants.

THETA INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Cow1ter- and Cross
Claimant,
V.

CHAD ESKELSEN and LORNA
ESKELSEN,

Civil No. l 20500400

Counterclaim

Defendants,

Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox

VC HOLDINGS, LLC and VAUGHN
Ci

HANSEN,

Cross- claim Defendants.
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This matter came before the above-titled Court on October 16, 2015,
on Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Make Additional Findings of Fact as well as
Defendant Theta Investment Company's Motion to Extend Time to Serve
Memorandum of Costs on Plaintiffs. Counsel for the Plaintiffs, Daniel J. Tobler,
and counsel for the Defendant Theta Investment Company, John R. Berger, was
present.
After reviewing the motions and hearing argument from counsel,
and good cause appearing therefore, the Court now makes and enters its Order on

<iJ

Motion to Amend and Make Additional Findings of Fact and Motion to Extend
Time to Serve Memorandum of Costs on Plaintiffs as follows:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as
follows:
1.

The Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Make Additional

•

Ki,

Findings of Fact is hereby granted in part and denied in part.
2.

Paragraph 51 of the Findings of Fact shall be amended to

replace the word 'Theta" with HJENCO."
3.

Paragraphs 7 and 23 of lhe Conclusions of Law shall be

amended to replace "2015" with "2011."

4.

Except as stated herein, the Plaintiff's motion is otherwise
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denied.
5.

The Defendant Theta Investment Company's Motion to

Extend Time to Serve Memorandum of Costs on Plaintiffs is hereby denied.
- - - - - - - - - - E N D OF O R O : E R - - - - - - - The Court Official's Signature AJ>pears at the Top Right of the First Page.

NOTICE

The foregoing ORDER ON M'OTION TO AMEND AND MAKE

AD.DITI0NAL FIN.DINGS OF FACT and MOTION TO EXTEND TIME
~

TO SERVE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS ON PLAINTIFFS has been
submitted to the Court for execution and entry. Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure allows seven (7) days following service for the opposing party to
submit notice of objectio.n. If such objection, as to form, is not received within the

subscribed time period, said Order wi 11 be executed by the Court.
DATED this 2.Q1h day of August, 2016.

/s/ Daniel J. Tobler

DANIEL J. TOBLER
Attomcy for Plaintiffs
CERTI.FICATE OF MAILING AND ELECTR0NI.C FILING
Gj

1 do hereby certify that on the

26 th day of August, 20 l 6, l did

personally place in the U. S. Mai], postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND AND MAKE ADDITIONAL
FINDINGS OF FACT and MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO SERVE
~

Gi

MEMORANDUM OF COSTS ON PLAINTIFFS in the above-titled case, to
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ARTICLES OF ORGAN1ZAT10~
OF

VC HOLlllJ\GS, LLC
The undersigned. acting pursuant to the L:tah Re.vised limited Liability Company Act
(the '·Ac.r'~). adopts the following Articles of Organi·Lalion for the pwrpose. of organizing a Utah
Iimitcd Iiabi lity con1pan y (the "Company>}
:\arne. The Comp,my's name is VC Holdings, LLC.

1.

2.
1 enn. The Company will condnue. tmti l 99 years afce-r the date of the Compauy~ s
fonn~rcion\ unle~s sooner dissolved by law or as provided in thc-. Company's opera\ing agreement.
3.
Puqrnsc. The Company's puqJose is to engage in ,.tny lawfol net or ac.li vity for
which a limited liability company n1.ay be organized unde.r tbe Acl. .
4.
l\·fonagement. The Co1npa11y will be managed by one or more managers. The
mime and street address of the Companfs initial manager is: Carolyn S. Hansen~ P.O . .Box
2183. St. Geo1:ge: l..:tah 8477 J..

or

5.
l{egistered Agent. The name and street address
the Companfs initi~1l
rcgislered a!stnt is: Carolyn S. Hansen:. 2212 \Ve.st Soooma Lane: St. George, Ctah 84 770. The
Director of the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code is app()inted as agem of the
Company for servic-e of process if the registered agem has rc·signed~ lhe. registered agent's
authority has been revoked~ or the regjstered agent c,u111ot be. found or sc.rved wHh the exe.n:.ise nf
re.~onable diligence.

6.

Dt:signate<l Office. The Compa.n.y .s registered c.1ffice is its designated oftic.e.

7.

Organizer. The name and addre_ss of the Companls Organizer is Carolyn S.

1

Ffansen: P.O. Box 2183. Sr. George~ Utah 84771.

'Zro.$.

RECEIVED

~~~\_,/"'

Carolyn S. ·1-1anse11 Organi2.e?'...-.....
1

STATE TAX COMM1SSlON

JAN O6 2005
OPEBAT: :--~J,.--GEOAGE

c .•
BY c~. _....;,-s-···---··
)
_2..:::.S.
L.:.,.--

dA~.I------~-Brrolvn
S .. {ansen.. Re~istercd
X·eent
,
'""'
......

.,
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OPERA. TING AGREE~VlENT

OF
VC HOLDINGS, LLC

THIS AGREEMENT (this ;tAgreemene) is between Carolyn S. Hansen and Vaughn L.
Hansen> as meh1.bers of VC Holdings~ LLC, a Utah limited liability company.
RECI'I'ALS

The parties to this Agreement are all of the initial members of VC H()ldings, LLC, a Utah

limited liability c-ompan~' (the • Compan/~). The parties jotend by this Agreement to define their
rights aJ1d obligations with respect to the Compan·f s governance ru1d financial affai.rs and to
adopt regulatio11s and procedures for the c.onduct of Lhe Company>s activities. Accordingly! they
agree as follows:
1

ARTICLE 1: DEFINITIO:.'1S
1.1
Scope. For purposes of this Agreement~ unless the langl1age or con.text clearly
indic,1tes thnl a different meaning is intended: capitalized Le.nm; have the meanings specified in
lhis A1:t1cle 1.

1.2

. Defln ed Terms.
(a)

1

~AcC means the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act.

(b)
:.Affiliaret with respect to a Person= means ( 1) a Person that, directly or
indirectly. through one or more incermediades, controls= is controlled by or is under common
control "vith the Person, (2) a Person \:\,ho O\\iTIS or controls nt least ten percent of the outstanding
.voting interests of the Person; (3) a Person who js an officer, director, nianager or generaJ partner
of the Person, or (4) a Person who is an officer= director, manager: general partner. trustee o·r
owns at least ~en percent of the outstand1ng voting inte.rests of a Person described in clauses ( 1)

through (3) of this sentence.
(c)

t•Agreemem~~ means this agreement, inc.luding any amenclrnents.

{d)
"'Articles,: means the articles of organization filed \Vith the Div is ion to
organize the Company ns a limited liability company\ including any amendments.

(e)

t•Avaj]able Fuods/1 for a Taxable Year, means the Compan{s gross cash

receipts from any source, less the sum of: (1) payments of p1focipal, interest:: chorges and .tees

then due pe.rtainh.1g to the Cornpa.n/s indebtedness; (2) expenditures incurred incident to the
usual conduct of ·tbe:: Company's business; and (3) amounts reserved to meet the reasonable
current and anticipated needs of the Company's business.
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··sankrupccy/ with respect to a Member, means ( l) the Membe(s general
assignment for [be benefit of creditors: (2) the filing of a petition or answer seeking for the
Member any reorganization: arrangement: composition, re-adjustment, liquiclatio11: dis·solution,
protection or ~imilar relief in any state or fede.ral bankruptc.y, insolvency~ reorganization or
receivership proceeding or (3) the filing of an answer or other pleading admjtting or failing to
contest rhe material allegations of a petition filed against the Member in any state or federal
hankruplcy~ insolvency, reorganization or receivership prncetdi ng.
1

l.f)

.:Capital Accm.mC of a Member means th~ capital account ma1mained for

(g)

the Member in accordance \Vith A1ticle 4.5.
(h)

.;Code': means the Internal Revenue Code of l 986~ as amended.

··Compani: means VC Holdings, LLC and any suc.c.essor limited liability

. (i.)
CQrwpany.

(j)
··Contribution'' means anything of va]ue that a Member cot1tribures to the
Company as a prerequisite for or in connection with membership. including any combination of
cnsh: property, service~ rendered:- a promissory note or any other obligation to contribute cash or
property or render services.

(k).

··Designated Office'' means the Company~s office m Utah where the
Companf s rc:;cords are required to be maintained.
(1)
"Dissolmion, '' with respect to an Entity, means ( 1) th~ filing of articles of
dissolution on the Entity's behalf: (2) the Errtitfs administrative dis~olution: unless the Entity is
reinstated wilhin the time period prescrihed by applicable lm,v or (3) any other event that initiates

the C:ntity!s ,:\,·inding up under applicable law.
(m)

-coissociation·· means a complete termination of a Member:s membership

in the Company in consequence of an event dcsc.ribed in A11icle 3.9.

· (n)

aoistribution~' meaas the Company's direct or indirect transfer of money

or other property with respect ro a Membership Interest, other than (l) issuance of a Membership
( nterest: (2) issuance of evidence of indebtedness: (3) reasonablt- compensation for past or

prestnt services or (4) reasonable payments made it1 tl1e ordinary course of business
a bona fide retirement plan or other benefits program.

pur~uant

to

1

(o)
•'Oivision means the Division of Corporatiom; and Commercial Code of
the CLah Department of Commerce.
'

· (p)

.:Effective Date;' with respect to this Agreement: rnenns the date on which

the Curnpany= s existence as a limjted 1-iability cornpany begins, as pre~cribed by the Act.

(q)

·'Entity:, means an association_. relationship or artificial person through or

by rnem1s of whkb an enterprise or activity may be lav,rfolly conducted: including: without

2
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limitation: a doniestic

l)r

foreign corporationi nonprofit corporation? limited liability company?

general partnership: \jmitcd partnership, business trust: association trust: estate? jo1nt venture~
cooperative or governmental unit.
1

(r)
nrncapaciry/: with respect to a Member or Managcr means irnpair111ent by
reason of mentaJ illness: mental deficiency, physical illness or disability chronic use of drugs~
1

1

(ii)

clu·onic intoxication or other cause to the extent the Member or Manager lacks suffkient
underst,rncling or capacity to make or conununicate respon~ible decisions.

(s)"
:::'vlanage(' means a Person, whether or not a Member. who is vested with
authority to manage the Company in accordance with Article 5.
(t)
:.:Member': me.ans an initial Men~ber and any Person who subsequently is
admitted as an additional or substitute Member after lhe Effective Date, in ncc-ordance with
Article 3.l(a).

(u)
•tMembership InceresC me-ans a :Vlember's pe-rcentage int~rest in the
Company, consjsting of the Member!s right Lo share- in Profits, receive Distiibutions, parlicipate
in the Companf s governance~ approve the Company's acts, µanicipate in the desig~ation aod
re.moval of a Manager and receive information pertaining to the Compants t1ffoirs. The
~v1.ernbership Interests of the initial Members are set forth in Article 0. Changes in tvfembersbip
Jnteresrs after the Effective Date: including those necessitated by the admission clJ1d Dissociation
of Members, will be rcflee-ted in ·the Companf s records·. The allocation ofl'vfembership Interests
reflected in the Company~s records from time to time ~s presumed to be correct for al) purposes
of this Agreement and the Act.
(v)
:.:Mintmum Gainn means mrn1mum gain as defined 1n sections 1.70L1- ·
2{b)(2) and l .704--2(d) of th~ Regulations.

~-Person" means a natural person or an Entity.
(x)
''Profit/ as to a positive amount~ or .:Loss/: as to a nega.tive amount.
mt'-ans. for a Taxable Year, the Compan(s net taxable income or loss for the Taxable Yem\ as
dete.m,ine.d in ac.cordancc with sec-tion 703(a) of the Code, with the following cldjustrnems: (1)
all items required ro be separately state-ct pursuant to section 703(a)(1} of the Code \-Vill be
ucc.:ounted for in the aggregate~ (2) any incon1e that is exempt for federal income tax purposes
\.Vill be included;. and (3) any item tbat is specially alloca1ed pursuant to Article 4.2(6) wi]l be
disregarded.

··Reg.ul at ions:• means proposed! temporary or final
(y)
promulgated under the Code by the Department of the Treasury~ as amended.

regulations

tz)
.;Tax Pe.rcentagei'" for a Taxable Year, means the. sum of (1) the highesl
federal income t,LX rate applicable to the taxabJe income of an individual and (2) the highest Utah
income lax rate applicable to the taxable income of an individual resjdent of Utah .
....

J
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(aa) · ;,Taxable Yeru-=~ meam the Companis taxable year as determined

111

acc:.on.1ance with Artie.le 6.1.

(bb) :'Transfer,•: as a noun~ means a transaction or evem by which O\:vnership or
a .tvlembership Interest is changed: includiog, without limhation. a sale.:, exchange~ disu·jbution.
abandonment: gift! devise or foreclosure. "Transfer/ as.a verb: means to effect a Transfer.

aTntnsferee= means a Person who acquires a Membership Interest by
Transfer from a Member or another Transferee and 'is not admitted as a Member in accordance.
(cc)

1

,vith Article 3.l(b).

ARTlCLE 2: THR COMPANY

2.1

Status. The Company is a l;lah limited liabiliiy company organized under lhe

·2.2

N:tme. The Companfs name is VC Holdings~ LLC.

Act.

2.3
Term. The Companis existence as a limited liability company will commence.
on the Effective Date cmd continue until tenninated under the: Act or this Agreement.
2.4 . Purpose-.s. The Cornpanis purpose is to engage in any Lav.fol act or ac-ti.vity for
,vhich a limiLed liability company may be organized under the Act.
2.5

Designated Office nnd Registered Agent.
(a)

Designated Office.
( l)

The Companis registered office is its Desjgnated Office.

(2)
The Company at any time. may c.hange the location of its
Designated Office by filing a staternent of change with the Division within 30 days after the

effective elate of the change.
(b)

Registered Office and Agent.
(1)

I

The Com pony s initial registered office is Located

.:it

221 2 West

Sonoma Lane SL. C,eorge, Utah 84 770 and 1ts initial registered agent at that )ocation is Carolyn
S. Hansen.
I

{2)

The Company at any time may change the locatlon of its registered

office or the Ldentity of its registered agent by filing a statement of change with the Divis·ion
wilhin 30 days after chc .effective date. of the change. However. the location of the registered
agent's business otlice must remain the same as the locaLion of the Company}s registered office.
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C3) . "If the location of the registe.red agenf s business office changes: the
registered agent may change the location of the Compa.i1y:s registered. office by giving written
notice of the change to the Company and filing a statement of change with the Division \Vithi.11
30 days after the effective date of the cbange.
ARTICLE 3: MEMBERS

3.]

Identification.

[niLial Member$. The nomes~ addresses and Membership fate.rests of the jniLial y(e.n1bers are as
icJllows:

/

Carolyn S. Hansen
P.O. Box 2183

St. George, Utah 84771
50%

Vaughn L. Hansen

../

P.O. Box 2183
St. George~ Utah 84 77 l
lfl)
Add1tiona] and Substitut~ Members. The Company may admit addition<il
or subsLilule Members only with the approval of alJ Members. A Member may v\'ithhold
approval of tbe admission of any person for any or
reason.

no

,..,-,,

il(

(_b)
RigbLs of Additional or Substi1ute ·Members. A Person adrnlttecl as an
additional or subsr-itule l\1fember has all the rights and powers ,md is subject to all the restrictions
and obi igations of a Member under this Agreement and the Act.
3.2
Veriflcntion of Membership Interests. \Vii.bin 10 days after receipt of a
.Vlembcr's written request~ the Company wilJ provide the Membe.r ·,,_.: · · .::tatement of the
~v(en1ber~s Membership 'fntercst The statement \Vill serve the ~uit: j......
... 0f verifying the
Ylernber~s M.embership Interest, as reflected in the 'Companf s records, and wit.I nol constitute
for any purpose a ce11ificated security) negotiable in~trument or other vehicle by wbic.h a
Transfer of a tvlembership Interest may be effected.

.,
3 .J

Manner of Acting.
(a)

\ti eeti n gs.

(I)
Right to Call. Any Manager or any Me.rnber o.r combination of
Members \-Vhosc \If ernbership [nterest exe-e-ecls 10 perc.ent may call a meeting of Me.rnbei:s by
gjving ,,vritlen notice to all Members not less than 10 nor more than 60 days prior to the elate of
1.he meeLing. The notice 111.ust specify the date of the meeting and the nat.ure of any business to he
Lran sac.led. ·

5
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Proxy Votim2. A tv'[ernber may act at a rnteLing of t-.1kmbers
through a Person aurbcrrized by a written proxy signed by the Member and filed with the
sc.:c.:re-tary of the meeting before or at the time of the meeting.
f).)

Ollorum. Members \Vhose aggregate Membership Interest exceeds
50 perceLTl will constitute a quorum al a meeting of Members. No action may be taken in l]1e
(3)

absence of a quorum.
(4)

Reqt1ired Vote. Except \.vlth respect to matters for which a grealet

minimum vote is required by this Agreement, the vote of Members present whose aggregate
tvlembership [merest exceeds 50 percent of the aggregate Membership Interest of all Members
present wi-11 cc.rnsti tute the act of the Members at a mee.ti ng of Members.

Gon~ent

(b)
·written Consent. The Me-n:tbers may act without a meeting by written
describing the uction and signed by all \1embers.

3.4
Limitation on Tndiv-idual Authority. A Mernber who is nol also a Manager has
no authority to bind the Company. A Member whose unauthorized act obligates the. Company to
a third party will indemnify the Company for any costs or damages the Company incurs as a
result of the unauthorized act.

3.5
Negation of Fiduciary Duties. A Member who is not also a Manager owes no
fiduciary duties to the Company o.r to the othe.r Members solely by reason of being a YletJ:iber.
A Member at any tiine may withdrav\ from the
Company by giving written notice to the Company rind the other tv·Iembers at leas·1 60 da)·S prior
to the effective date of the withdrawal.
3.6

·withdrawal of a Member.

1

3.7
Exrulsion of a Member. Except a~ provided in sectioJ1 48-2c-7 l 0(3) of the Act.
neither the Company nor the Members have power to expel a~,{ ember for any reason.
3.8

Transfer of Membership Interes·t.

Transfers Prohibited. A f\llember may not Tnmsfor: directly or indirectly!
any portion or al) of a Membership lntercst without the Companis prior \.vrinen consent. With
respecc to a Member that is an Entity, a change in the conlrol of lht! tvfember is an indirect
·rl'ansfer for purpose.s of this Article 3.8. A change in control occurs if 10 consequence of a
Trnr1sfcr of an i ntcrcst in the Member any Person cca!-.cs to be tlll Affiliate of any olh~r Person.
· (a)

i;

(b)
Prohibited Transfers Void. lf a Member allernpt~ to Transfer ,my portion
or all of a Membership Interest 111 c.ontravention of tbe provisions of this Article J.8: the
purported Transfer wilJ be nuJI and void.

Transferor's Membership Status. If a l\1[ember Tnmsfers less than all of
the tvfernbership Inlerest, che .tv[ember~s rights w1th respect to the transferred portion> including
the right to vote or otherwise participate in the Compan{s governance. and the dght lo reeeive
(c)

)
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Oistribu-ii<rn::;. ~-viii lermina1.r:- as of the effecLive date of the Transfer. However, the Mern.hei- will
remain liable. for any obligat.ion with respect to the transferred portjon that existed prior to 1he
diective date of lhc Transfer~ including nny costs or damages resulting from the \tlcmber:s
breach of tbis Agreement. If the Member Transfers al) of the lvlembership Interest~ the Traosfer
will constitute an event of Dissociation for purposes of Article 3.9.
(cl)

Transferee: s Status.

(I)
Admission as a Mernbtr. A Member who Transfers a. Membership
f nleresl has no_ power· to confer on the Transferee the status of a \If e.rn ber. A Tra.nsferee may be
adrnitted as a f\.1Iember only in accordance with the provisions of Article 3.l(b). A Tntnsferee
who is not admitted as a Membe.r has only the rights described in 1his Article 3.8.
(2)
Riuhts of Non-Member Transferee. A Tnmsferee who is not
ad milled as a Mem be:r in accordance. w-ith the provisiO'LlS of Artie.le 3. l (b\ (i) has no right lo voce
or otherwise participate in the Corn.pany's governance: (i;) is not entitled to recei\.;e i nfonnation
conccming the Company's affairs or inspect the Companis books and records: (iii) with re.spect
to the transferred Membership Interest, is entitled to rec.eivc tbe Distributions to which the
).'lember ,.voulcl. have been entitled had the Transfrr not occtured ,u1d (iv) is subject to .the
restrictions imi)osed by this Article 3.8 to the same extent as a Member.
J.9

Dissoci~1tion.

(a)
Events of Dissociation. A M.ember,s Dissociation from the Company
ou.:ur!; upon: (l) the Member's withdrawaJ or expulsion from the Company; (2) the Member's

Transrer of the l'.vfember,s entire tvlembership Interest; (3) as to a Member who js a natural
person, the Member:s lnc-apacicy or death~ (4) the Membe(s Bankruptcy; (5) as ·to o Membt:r
who holds a tvlcmbership Interest as a fiduciary, distribution of the entire Membership Interest to
the beneficial owners; or (6) as to a Member that is an Entity~ the Entitf s Dissolution.
(b)

Rights of tvfomber Fol.lowing Dissociation.

(I)
If a Member, s Dissociation occurs for un y reason other tfam the
Member:s lncapacity or death. then, after the effec.tivc date of the Membe.I'$ Dissociation; (i) the
fv(ember win have no right to vote or othe1wise participate in the Company>s governance and
affairs. (ii) t:'Xtt!pl as provided in Article 6. 1(b): the Member will not be enlitled to receive
information concerning the Companls affairs or inspect the Conipanf s books and retords and
(iii) if Lhe event th.at results in the \'[ember's Dissociation does not terminate the f'.llember~s entire
interest in the Companis profits and capital~ then. \•Vith respect to the interest the Member
retains~ tbt! Member wilJ be entitled to receive the Distributions to \.Vhich the Member would
have been enLitled had the Di.ssocintion not oc.cuned. Except as prnvided in this paragraph~ a
dissociating Member will have no right to rec.:eive Distributions or otherwise participate in tbe
Company's fimmcial affairs.
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(2)

If o Member~s Dissociation occurs by rea~on of the Membcr"s.

rncapucity or death= the Member: s legal representative may exercise the Member=s rights under
this ,\greement and u,e Act for Lhe sole. purpose of settHng the Mcmber,s est.ate or ndrnini~terin~,

0

the :Vlember~s property: as the case may be.

(3)

Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this Article 3. 9(6 )! a

dissociating yfernber will remain liable for any obligation to the Company that existed prior to
t.be effective date of the Dissociation, including any costs or dmnages resulting rrom tbe
tv(ernbe(s breach of this Agreement.

ARTLCLE 4: FINA.NCR
4.1

Contributions ..

(a)
described bclo"v:

Initial Members.

Tht: initial members will make the Contribulions

(1)

Carolyn S. Hanse.n will contribute cash in the arn.ount of$1~000.

t2)

Vaughn L. Hansen will contribute cash in the amount of$ l ~000.

(b)
Additional Members. A Person admitt.e.d as a Member in c.onnection with
the acquisition of a Membership Interest directly from the Company after the Effecti\=e Date wi'JI
make the Contributions specified in the ag.reement pursuant to whLch tbe Pe.rson is admitted as a
:vfc:mber.
(c)

Additional Contributions.

Pennitted. The Cornp(my may authorize additional Contributions
at such times and on such tcnns and conditions as il detem1ines to be in its be.st interest.
(1)

(2)
Required. If at any time the Company determines that ils financial
resources are· insufficient to meet the reasonable needs of its bus·ines~, it may require the
Members to make additional Contributions sufficient to meet those nel!ds. The :VIembers will
make the a.clditional Con~ribucions in proportion to tbeir Membership Interests. The Company
must give eac-h lv1ember written notice of the obligat1on to contribute additional capital. The·
notice must explain the need for additional capital~ 8pecify the amount the M.ember is required to
contribute and establish a due date that is not less than JO days after the. date of the notice. The
l\ lember will make the Contribution in immedialely available funds on or before Lhe due dare
specified in the notice.
1

(,3)

Default Remedies. If a lvfembcr does not contribute tbe Member's

share of a required additional contribut1on on or·before the due date, the Company may take such
action as it considers necessary or approptiate to enforce the Member's obligation.
8
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(4)
Creditors, Ri12hts. A ~v1ember·s obligation to make addirional
contributions ext<:~nds only co the Compn:ny and may 1;ot be enforced by the Con1pany~s creditors
without the Member's written consent.

Contributions Not .Interest Bearing. A Member is not entitled to interest
or other compensation with respect to any cash c1r property the Member contribule~ to the
(d)

Cornpany.

(e)
No Return of Contribution. A Ylember is not entitled to the return of a.ny
Contcibution prior to the Company7s dissolution and winding U]J,
Allocation of Profit nnd Loss.

4.2
(j!J

(a)
General Allocation. The Compan./s Profit or Loss tor a Taxable Year.
including the Taxable Year in whic-h the Comp~ny is dissolvcd will be allocated among lhe
Memht.rs in propC>rtion to their Membership Interests.
1

(b)

Special Allocations.

( l)
ff a Vf embe-r unexpecled]y receives an adjustment allocation~ or
distribution de~cribed in sections 1. 704-l(b)(2)(ii)(d)(4), (5) or (6) of the Regulatio11s that creates
or incre.ases a deficit in the lvfember:s Capital Account as of the end of a Ta.,-xable Year~ a pro ra.ta
portion of each item of the Companis income, incJuding gross ine-ome and gain for tbe Taxable
Year and~ if necessary, for subsequent years will be. allocated to the Member in an amount and
manner sufficient to eliminate the deficit in the Member~s Capital Account as qu.ick}y os
possible.
1

(2)
lf a Member would have a. deficit in his or her Capital Account at
che. end of a Taxable Year tJ1at. exceeds the sum of (i) the amount the 1vfember is required to pay
lhe Company' pursuant to an obligation described in section 1. 704-l(b)(2)(ii)(c) of the
Regulations aJ1d (ii) the Member's share of Mh1imum ·Gain~ a pro rata portion of each item of the
CompaJ1y s income, including gross income and gai11 for the Taxable Year v.,:iU be allocated to
Lhe ~~ember in a:n amount and manner s11fficient to eJiminate the deficit in the Member's Capitnl
Account as quickly as possible.
1

1

If there is a n.et decrease in the Company's Minimuni Gain during
a. raxablc Y car, the items of the Company's income, including gross income and g,1in, for rhc
Taxable Year and~ if necessary. for subsequent Taxable. Years wil] be allocated to the Members
in proportion to rheir shares of the net decrease in Minjmurn Gain. [f the aHocat1on made by this
paragraph would cause a clis-corl:ion in the economic ,m·aDgement among the Members and it is
expet:tecl that the:: Comp,tny ,.vill not have suffkient income to correct thal distortion~ the
Company may seek to have the Internal Revenu_e Service ,..vaive the· requirement for Lbe
allocarion in accordance with section I. 704-2(f)(4) of the Regulations.
(J)

(j)
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flem~ of the Compani s loss, deductions and expend1ture:-5
described in sectiffn 705(.a)(2)(B) of the Code that are· charactetized as ((partner nonrec-ourse
deductions uncler Section l .704w2(i) of the RegulaLions will be alloc::ned to the .Members
according to the ratjo in vvhich the Members beru- tbe economic. risk of loss with respect to the
n.olU'ecourse liabilities to ,.vhich such items nre attributable.
l 41

0

1

~

(5)
ltems of income: gain: loss and deduction wi.th respect to property
contributed to the Componts capital will be allocated between the Men:1bers so ns to take into
account any variation between book value ,md basis, to the extent and in the nrnnner prescribed
by section 704(c) of lhe Code and rela~ed Regulations.

(6)

ff the speciaJ allocations required by this Artie.le 4.2(b) resu1t in
CapitaJ Account balances that are differem from the Capital Account balances the :vfember:,
would have had if the special allocations were not required~ the Company wi11 aJJocate othe.r
ite.ms of income: gain, loss and deduction in any manner it considers appropriate lo offse·t the
effects of the ·speciaJ allocations on the Members~ Capital Account bala.nc.es. An>· offsening
a\localion required by this paragr~1ph is subjecl to a.nd must be consistent v,:ith the spt~cial

allocations.
(c)
Effect of Transfers Dori1rn. Ye,1r. The Company will prorate ite,ns
attributable to a Membership Interest that is the subjec-t of a Transfer dm"ing a Taxable Year
between the transferor and the Transferee based on the portion of the Taxable Year that elapsed
prior to the Trans fer.

4 .3
Tnx Allocations. For federal income tax purpose.s: Ltt)less the Code or
Regulations ·otherwise requires~ each item of the Company's income, gain, loss or deduction will
be allocated to the Members in proportiori to their allocations of the. Company's Profit or Loss.
4.4

Distributions.

(a)
lvlinirnum Disl"ribmion to Pav Ta.x. Within 90 days after the close of each
Taxable. Year! 1.he Company will distribute to each Member an amount e4ual to the product of
the Tax Percentage and the Profit alloc.ated to the Member for the Taxable Year.

(b)
Remaining Available funds.
The CompaL1y will distribute to the
Yl:embers: at annual intervals, any Availahle Funds remaining afte.r providing for the Distdbution
required by the preceding paragraph.
(c)
Allocation. Except as provided in Article 4.4(.a)~ the Company ·,~. ill make
all Disnibutions to the Membe(s in proportion to their Membership [nterests.

(d)
Prohibited Distributions. The Company rn.ay not make a Di~t,;burion if.
after giving effect to the Distribution.(]) the Compa.ny \vould not be able to pay its dehts as they
become due iri rhe usual and regular course of 11s business or (2) the fair ma1let value of the
Comprtn{s total assets would be less tl)an the sum ()f its total liabilities. The Company~s

)
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dete:1111ination of it.s c,1pacity to rn.ukc H Distribution rn1der this Artie.le 4.4(d) will be made as of
th!! date and in accordance with a rnetbod authorjzed by section 4 8-2c- l 005(2) of the Act.
(e)
l\"egation of Right to 0-istri.bution in Kind. Exe-ep1 as provided in Anicle
7.2, a \tlcmbcr has no right to demand and receive a Distribution in a fonn 0th.er t11ru1 cash.
(t)
Oblig.ation Lo Return \1/rongful° Distribution. lf for any reason a Member
i:eceives a DisLribuLion to v.,hich the Member is not legaJly entitled~ the Member will return the
Discribulion to the Company ,vi thin 30 days after receiving notice of the wrongful Distribution.

(g)

QI)

Waiver of Obligation to Return Rightful Distribution. Except lo tbe exlent
required by section 48-2c-603 of the Act! a !vfember has no I iability to return to the Company a
Distribution to which the Mernher is legally entitledt regardless of 1he Company1 s inabi]jty to
d ischar~~e its t1b ligations to its Creditors.
4.5

c~1pital Accounts.

(a)
General Maintenance. The Company will establish and maintain a CapiLal
Accoum for eac-h Member. A Member's CapitaJ Ac-c.ount will be:
( 1)
increased by: (i) the amount of any money the tvlember contributes
to the Company's capita); (ii) the fair market value of any property the Member contributes lo
the Coinpants capital~ net of any liabilities the Company assumes or to which the property is
subject; and (iii) the Ylembefs share of Profits~ and

(2)
decreased by: (i) the amount of any money U1e. Company
cl"istribllles to lhe :"v'Iember; (ii) tbe fai.r market value. of any prope1iy the Compai1y distributes to
the. Memb~r~ net of any liabilities the Member assumes or to which the propert); is subjee-\~ aod
(iii) Lhe Member's share of Losses.
(b)

Adi ustmerits.

( l)
Distributions in L<.ind. ff nt any time the Company distribute~
property in kind, it wi]] adjust the Members Capital ;_\ccounts to account for their shares of any
Profit or Loss the Company would have real1zed had it sold the property at fair market value and
distributed the sale proceeds.
1

Acgu-is·jtions i."\J.l~LB.ede.mptions. ff al any time a Person acquires a
fvlernbersh1p Interest frl1m the Company or the Company redeerns a Mem.bership I.merest: the
Company wil I adjust the Member~/ Capital Accounts to account for their sh,m~s of any PJOfil or
Loss the Comptu1y wouJd have realized had it sold all of its as~ets at fair market value on Lhe
date of the acquisition or redemption.
(2)

(c)
Transfer of Capital Account. · A Tnmsferee of a Membership Interesr
succeeds to ·che portion of the transferor,s Capital Ac.count that corTesponds to the portion of the
.Vlembership fnteresc that is the subject of the Transfer.
11
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(d)
C.\,mUJlianc.c with Code. The requirements of tbjs i\..nide 4.5 are intended
and "viii be construed to ensure that the allocation!s of the Company's income. gain:- losse~,
tleduccions and credits have substantial economic effect under the Regulations promulgated

under section 704(b) of the Code.
ART[CLE 5: MANAGE-'MENT

~

Representative :vlanagement. The Company ~ill be managed by Managers.
The ~rs-from t.irne to time may establish and change the number of Managers. The name
and business address of the Company's initial Manager is Carolyn S. l-hmsen: P.O. Box 2183; St.
George, Utah 84 77 l.
5.2
Powers and Authorit) Except for matters on which the l'v[embers: approval is
required by this Agrcement the Managers have full powe.r, authority and discrelion to manage
and direct the .Companf s business, affafrs and prope1tie!:i, including, without \imitation, the
specific powers conferred by the. Act.
1

•

1

IVlanner of Acting.

5.3

(a)
Q.mcral. The Managers may ac-t with respect lo any matter within _the
scope of their authority at a meeting of Managers or pursuant 10 fonnal or i~1for111al proc.:edures
adl)pt.ed at a meet1ng of :vtanagers. Procedures that 1nay be adopted at a meeting of Managers
include\ without limitu.tion: the establishmcm of dates and times for regular meetings: procedure~
pur~uant to wqic;.h I.he. Mana~ers may approve a matter without a rneeting and~ subjee-t to Lbe
provisions of Article 5 .6~ the delegation of duties and responsihil ities wirh respect to which Lhe
delegate may act without approval or racification by the othe-r Managers.
(_b)
Written Consent. The Manag.ers may act without a rnceting by written
consent describing the action and signed by a.11 i'vlanagers.

(c)
Required Approval. The Managers' unanimous approval is required for
an~' marter arising within the scope of their authority.

(d)
Pat1icipatioo bv Non-Member Managers. The fact that a Manager is not
c1lso a Member in no \,Vay limits the Manager~s right to vote 011 any matter properly within the
scope of the .Managers: authority rn1der this Agreeme-nt.
Notwithstanding any other prov1s1on of this
,.:.\greernem: w1thoul the approval of Members whose aggregate Membership interest' is at least
51 perc.:ent~ the Manage.rs may take no action with respect to: the sale, lease1 exc.hange mortgage,
5.4

Required Member Appro':al.

1

pledge or other disposition of all or substantially all of the Company's assets; the. Company's
merger \vith or conversion into another Entity; a11 undertaking involving a debt or ohligation in
cxc.:ess of $5 000.00; the cornpromtse of a dispute involving ~Ul amouot in controversy in excess
of $5 .000.00~ a transaction involving a conflict of interest between a J\,fanager asid the Company~
1

)
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including tlw t?.S1ablisllm~nl of the. :V[anager's compensation; acceptance of an ndditional

Contribution volunt·"1ri]y tendered by any Member~ rede.mption of a Membership lntere.st;
l)istributions in_ excess of Available Fund!>; and tbe indemnificntion of a Manager.
Agency Power and Authority. A Manager apparently acting for the CompaL1y in
the usual course of its business bas tht power to bind the Company and no person has an
obligation to inqllirc into the Manager:s actual authority to act on tbe Company's behalf.
However: if a tvfanager acts outside the scope of the Manager,s actual authority, the Jvianager
,vii I indemnify the Company for any costs or damages jr incurs as a rcsuJt of the unauthorized
act..·
J.)

5.6
Delegation of Autbo.rity. A Manager at any time may delegate to any other
Manager, in whole or in part~ the delegating tvfanager\s authority aJ1d powers to manage tbe
Companis bu$iness, affairs and prope11ies. Any such delegation must be. e.ffected by a wTitt.en
instrument that (a} specifies U1e scope and duration of the clclegation (b) reserves to I.he
delegating Vlanagcr the power to revoke Lhe delegation at any time and for any or no renson, (c)
prohibits substitution without the delegating ~1anager,s written c.onsent and (d) is signed by Lhe
delegating Manager and delivered to the delegate. While a delegation is in effect; the delegaLe
rnay exercise the delegated authority and powers with the same force and effect as if the
delegating Manager bad personally joined in the exercise of the delegated authority and powers.
1-Iowever, the delegating Manager will not be liable for any action so taken. DeJegation of a
tvfanager's authority and powers pur!-iua.nt to this ArticJe 5.6 wil] not cause the delegating
tvkU1ager lo cease to be a lvfonager.
1

,,.---....._

i>(_/,)

.5. 7

Fief nci1n1' Du tics .
(a)

Stilndan1 of Care.

( 1)
Liabil itv for Wrongful Acts. A Manager is Iiable co and will
indemnjfy the Company for al I costs, expense.s or d.amages attributable to an act or omiss1on that
c;onstitutes a breach of this Agreement, negligence= rn.isconduct or a vio]ation of la"v.
Justifiable R.eliance,. A tvlnnager may reJy on the Cornpany's
records niai.ntained in good fa_ith and on information, opinions, reports or statements received
fr<Jm any Person pertaining to matters the lvfnnager re{lsooably believes to be \A,;ithin the Person ls
expertise or competence.
(2)

(b)
Co,12Qetlng Activities. A lvlanager moy participate in any business or
activity without a.ccounting to the Company or the Members. A Manager mny notl however.
accept a business opportunity for the Manage{s ovv·n account that the Manager believes or has

reason to be Iieve the Company would accept if hrough.t to its anent.ion. A ·~vfanager ITlUSl
disclose to the Con,pany any such business opportunity of which the tvfanagcr becomes aware.
If the Cornpany dee! i nes to accept the oppommity, the l'vfanager may pursue it for the Marni.ger' s
ovm acc.:ount. If the lv{::inager fai Is to disclose cbe oppommity, the Manager w·ill accounl to the

) .
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Company for any income U1e Manager derives from the opportuujcy and. wiJl indemnify the
Company for any loss -che Company inc.urs as a resul~ of the failure lo disclose.

~,\

(c.)
Self-Dealing. A \ilanager may enter into a business transaction with the
Company if t.he terms of the transaction are no less favorable to the Company than those of a
similar transaccion with an independent third. party. Approval or ratification by Members having
no intert.st in the transaction cons·titutes conclt1sive evidenc.:e that the tem1s satisfy tbe forege>ing
condition.

5.8

Indemnification and Advancement of Cost.s.

{n)

lncl.enmifica-tion.

( l)
:vt:andatorv. The Compi:Uly ,~·ill inde1nnify a Manager for all
expenses, losses, liabi]ities and damages the Manager actually and reasonably incurs in
connection \.Vith the :vianager:s suc.cessful defense of any claim, ac:tion or proceeding arising out
of or relaLing tp the Manager's conduct of the Con1pany's activities.

(2)
Pem1issive. The Company may, but is not required to. indemnify a
tv[armger for all expenses, los~e:;, liabilities and damages the Manager actually and reasonably
incurs in c.onnecLion with the Manager's unsuccessfuJ defense of any cla·hn: action or proceed.ing
arising out of or relating to the :Vfanage.r' s c.onduct of U1e Company= s activities, but only if (i) the
tvla.nage(s conduct was in good fi.1.ith: (ii) the Manager reasonably believed that the Manager:s
conduct was in: or not opposed to: the Company:s best interests, (iii) in Lhe case. of a criminal
proceeding: the \,fanager had no reason to believe the Manager's conduct \-VU!:i unlawful. tiv·) in
the case. of a p~·oceeding by or in the right of the Company\ the Manager was not adjudged liable
lO th~ Company and (v) in the case of any oLhe-r proceeding., the 'Manager was not adjudged liable
to any Person. on the basis that the Manager derived an improper personal benefit.

Advancement of Costs. The Company may, but is not re.quired to, pay for
or reimburse the expenses a Jvlanager actually and reasonabJy incurs in connection with a
proceeding arising out of or relating to the Manager's conduct of the Companls activities in
(b)

advance of final disposition of tbe proceeding: hut only if (1) the fvlanager furnishes to the
Compm1y a wrirten affirmation of the Manager's good faith belief that the. Manager has met tl1e
applicable standards of conduct described in Article. 5.8(a)(2)~ (2) the Manager f-umishes to the
Company a \\,titten, si.gned undertaking to repay the advance if it is ultirnately detennined thnt
the \fanager did not meet such standards of conduct and (3) the Company cletennines that tbe
facts then known by it ,vould not preclude indemnification under this Article 5.8.

Compensation. The Company wil I compensate a Manager for St'.rvices rendered
5.9
to or on behalf of the Company. The amout1t of the c-ompeosrition 'Nill be commensurate to tb~
value of the services and may be determined lvith or \vithout regard to Profit or other indicators
of the r~sults of operations. (C)mpensation paid to a Manager vvill be treated as an expense for
purposes of determining Profit. The Company will also reimburse each M.anager for reasonable
expenses properly incurred on the Company's behalf.

14
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5.10

Tenure.

(n)
T~11n. A Manager win serve until the earlier of: {I) the .Manager s
resignation; (2) the .Vlanager's removal; (3) the :vtanager's Bankmptcy~ (.4) as to a tvhmager who
is a natural person~ tbe Manager's Incapacity or death~ and (5) as to a Ylanager t.hat is an Entity.
the Manager's dissolution.
1

{_b)
Resim1ation. A Manager at any time may resign by \.vritten notice
delivered to the \If embers at least 30 days prior to the effective date of tJ1e resignation.
(c)

Removal. The Members at any time may remove a Manager~ with or

without cause.
(d)
Vacancv. ff a Manager for any reason ceases to act: the Memhcrs will
promJJ"tly elect a successor to serve until a successor is elected and qualified.
1

ARTICLE 6: RECORDS Al\""D ACCOVNT.Il'.G
6.1

{Vlaintenance of Records.

(a)
Reqllired. Records. The Company will maintain at its Designated Office
such books~ records and other materials as are reasonably necessary to document and acco1.mt for
its activities: including. without llmitalion:
(I)

a cunent list: in 1.tlphabetical order, of the full name and laslknov.,·n business; residence or mailing address of each Member and Manager~

{_2)

a copy of the

Articles~

(3)

copies of any signed µowers of attorney pursuant to which the

Arti<.:le!-i were signed;

(4)
a copy of the w1iting required of the Companf s organizer
pursuanl lO secLi.on 48-2c-40 I (2) of the Act;
(5)
copies of the Compa:ny:s federal, state a11d locnl income tax returns
and r<::ports for the three most recent TtL,o.ble Years;

(6)

copies of the Compallf s financial stmements for the three most

(7)

a copy of this Agreement, including any amendments; and

recent Taxable Years;

(8)
copies or any minutes of each meeting of tbe :VIernbers and of any
vv-ritten <.:onsents of the lvfembers.

15
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6.4

0

Tax Compliance..

(a)

Withholding. lf the Company· is required. by law or rcgulalion to with.hold

and pay over to tl governrncntnl agency any part or all of a Distribution or allocaLinn of Profit to

a tvlember:

( l)

Lhe amount

withheld will be considered a Distribution to the

Member; and .

(ib

(2)
if the WLthholding requirement pertains to a Distribution in kind or
an allocation of Profit: the Company
pay the amount required to be wit:hheld to the

wm

governmental agency ru1d promplly take such a<;tiori as it considers necessary or appropriate to
l'ccover a like nmmmt from the Member_, int:luding offset against any Djstributions to which the
Member would otherwise be entitled.
Tnx Matters Partner. The Company \:\'m designate a t\1lember lo act as the
''Tax :vlattcrs Partner" pursuant to Section 623 l{a)(7) of the Code. The Company may remove
anv. Tax Matters Partner.. ·with or without cause.... and des·ie:nate
a successor Lo anv Tax t,,,[atters
-...
Partner who for any reason ceases to act. A Member is eligible to serve as the Tax Matters
Partner only if (I) the ivfernber is then serving as a Manager or (2) no Member is then serving as
a :V1anager. The Tax Matters Partner will infom1 tbe Members of all administrative ,tnd judicial
proceedings pe11a111jog Lo the determination of the Company's tax 1tems and will provide the
tv1embers with copies of all notices rec.eived from the rntemal ReveDue Service regarding the
commencement of a Comprmyvlevcl audit or a proposed adjustment of any of the Company's tax
,te.ms. The Tax Marters Partner may extend the statute of limitations for assessment of tax
deficiencies against the Ylembers attributable to any adjustment of any tax item. The Compa.ny
wil I reimburse the Tax Maners Partner for reasonable expenses properly incurred while acting
\.vi thin the scope of the Tax Matters Partner':s authority.
(b)

~

ARTICLE 7: DISSOLCTION .
7.1

Ev('.nts of Dhisnlution.

u
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6.4
(a)

Withholding. lf the Company i.s required by law or regulation to withhold

and pay ewer ~n a governmental agency any part or all of a Distribution or allocation of Profit to
a Member:

t l)

the amount witl1held will be considered

c:1

Distribution to the

tvlember~ and

(2)
if the \•vithholding requirement pertajL1s to a Distribution in kind or
an allocation of Profit~ the Company will pay the amollnt required to be withheld to the
governmental agency and promptly take such action as it considers necessary or appropriate to
recover a like amOLmt from the Member, including offset against any Distributions to which the
tvlc1nber woulci o-lherwise be emitJed.
(b)

Tnx Matters Paiiner. The Company will designate a Member to act

ilS

the

''Tax :vrattcrs Partner'' pursuant to Section 623 l{a)(?) of the Code. The Company may remove
any Tax Matters Partner~ wi"th or \•Vithout cause~ and designate a successor to any Tnx Matttrs
P~~rtner who for any reason ceases to act. A Member is eligible to scwe as l_he Tax Matters
P,irtner only if (I) the Member is then serving as a Manager or (2) no Member is tben serving as
a :'vfanager. The Tax Matters Partner will in.form U1e Members of all administrative and judicial
proceedings penaining Lo the! determination of the Companyss ta-x items and ·\vill provide the
t\1kmbers witli copies of all notices received from the Internal Revenue Service regarding cbe
commence men Lof a Cornpnny-level audit or a proposed adjust1ilent of any of the Comptmy' s tax
items. The Tax Matters Partner may extet)d the statute of limitations for assessment of U:Lx
deficienc.ies against the \'kmbers attributable to any. adjustment of any tax item. The Company
will reimburse -che Tax Maners Parmer for reasonable expenses properly incurred while llcting
within the score of the Tax Matters Partner~s autho.rily.

ARTICLE- 7: DISSOLlTION
7.1

Events of Dissolution.

(a)

Enumeration. The Company will dissolve upon the lir!:it to occur of:

( l)

the date that is 99 years after the F.ffectjve Dute;

(2)
the vote of the Members to dissolve U1e Cc.)lnpa11y, unless the
dissolution is revoked in accordance '\.vith the provisions o~ section 48-2c.-1205 of the Act;

tri

(3)
any event that makes the Company ineligible to conduct its
acci vitie.s as a ljmi ted liability company under the Act;

@
(

.

•'
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the. Company°s administrative dissolution under section 48-2c1207 of lhe Act~ unks~ I.he Company is reinstated vtith1n the time prescribed by section 48-2cl :.I")

l 208 of the Act;

(5)

entry of a decree of judi.e-ial dissolution pursuant to section 48-2c-

l213 of the Act: or
(6)
a.ny event or circumstance that makes it unlawful or impossible for
c,u-ry on its business, unless the Company~~ incnpaci1y lo carry on its business is
cun=;d within 90 days afte-r such event or drcumstance.

Lhe Company

LG

(b)
Exclusivil:v of Events. Unless specifically referred to 10 lhis Article 7.1,
no event vviU result in the Company's dissolution.
7.2

Effect of Dissolut.ion.

ta)
AJ)pointment of Liquidator.
Upon the Company's dissolmion, the
Yl.anagers will _appoint a liquidator=- who may but need not be a Member. The liquidator w·ill
w1ncl Llp and liquidate the Company in an orderl)\ pnidcnt and expeditious manner in accordance
with the following provisions o.f this Article 7.2.
{b)
Final AccounLing. The Uquidator will make proper ac.countings ( l) to tbe
encl of the month in which the event or dissolution occ.uned and (2) to the date on wh.ich the
Com.pany is ·finally and comp1ete]y liquidated.
(c)
OuLies and Authoritv of Liquidator. The liquidator will make adequate
for the discharge of all of the Company's debts, obligations and liabilities. The
liquidator may' sell encumber or Tetaio for di~tribution in kind any of the Compan{ ~ assets.
Any gain or loss recognized on the sale of assets will be allocated to tbe .tvleinbers·· CapitaJ
Accounts in accordanc.:e with the provisions of Article 4.2. \Vith re.spect to any asset Lhe
liqu1dator determines to retain for distri.bu.tion in . k.ind: the liquidator ,,...,ii) al Joe.ate to the
Members' Capital Ac-counts the amount of gain or loss that would have been recogni7..ed had Lhe
assel been sold Dt its fair market value.

prov1s10L1

1

(d)
Final Distribution. The liquidator will distribute any assets remammg
after chc discharge or accommodation of the Companf s debt$, obligations and liabilities to 1.he
Members in proportion to their Ca.pita! Accounts. The liquidator will distribute any assets
disLribulable in kind Lu Lht= Members in undivided interests as tenants in common. A Member
whose Capital Account is negative will have no liability to the Company~ the Compan/$
creditors or any 0U1er Member with re$pect to the ncg?ttive balance.

wm

(e)
Required Filings. ·The liquidator
file articles of dissolution with the
Division and take. sL1th other actions as are reasonably necessary or appropria·te to effectuate and

confirm the cessation of tbe Cornpa.nls existenc.c.

18
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ARTICLE 8: GENERAL PROVJSIONS

8.1

Amendments.

(a)
Required Amendments. The Company~ the Manager and the Members
will execnte and file with the Divisi.on a certificate nf amendment of the Articles when (l) there
is a change in the Company's nmne, (2) there is a change in the character of the· Compan/s
bllsiness, as specified in the Articles: (3) there is a •false or el7'oneolls slaternent in the Articl.es,
(4) there is a change in the Companfs period of dLU'ation, (5) tllere is a change in the Company\
management s·trncture or (6) there is a change in the identity of any Manager. J.f any suc.:.h
amendment results in inconsistencies bel\.veeo Liu: Articles and this Agreement. this Agreement
will be considered to have been amended in the specifics necessary to eJiminate the
inconsistencies.

Ci

Other Amendments. Any Manager or any ~1.ember rnoy propose rqr
consideration nnd action an amendment to this Agreement or to the A.rticl.es. A p r o p o · ~ ·
amendment will become effective at such time a:s it is approved by tbe Managers a.nd u.ll
Members.
(b)

8.2
Power of Attorney. Each l\1fc111ber appoints each Manag.<:~r; with full pm-ver of
substjtul1on., as the tvfember~s attomey-in-fact, to act in the MembeI's name to execute and file
(a) all ce-rtifi~atcs. applications, reports and other instnunents necessary to qua.ljfy or 111ainrain
the Company as a limited liability company 1n the states and foreign countries ,,.,:1-1crc tbt'.
Company conducts its activities~ (b) all instruments that effect or coniinn changes or
modifications of the Company or its status, indudhtg:- withou1 limitadon: certificates of
amendment to the Articles a11.d (c) all instruments of transfer necessary to effect the Company"s
dissoluliou c:1r1d termination. The power of al:tomey g.ranted by ·th1s Arlicle 8.2 is in·evocable and
coupled with an i.nterest.

8.3
Nominee. Tille to Lhe Companf s assets may be held ·in the name of the
Cornpany or ~my nominee (including any lvfanager or any Member so acting): as the Company
<lete.rmioes. The Comp,u1/s agreement wilh any nor.ninee may contain provisions indemnifying
the nomjnee for costs or damages incurred as a result or the nominee,s service lL) the Company.
8.4
Investment Representation. Each Member represents to the Company and the
other \1embers that (a) the Member is acquiring. a Membership Intere.st in the. Company for
investment and for the Member's own account and not \Vith a view to its sale or d·istribution and
(b) neither Lhe Company nor any Member or Manager has made a:ny guaranty or representation
upon which the Member has re.lied cnnc.erning the possibility or probability of profit or loss
resulting from the Member:~ investment in the Compa.ny.

I

I

\___,/•'

I
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Rl"~.;;olutfon of Disputes.

8.5

Mediation. The parties will endeavor i11 good faith to resolve all disputes
ari!:>ing umk.r or related to this Agreement by med1ation according, to the the.n pre\ ailing rules
and procedures of the American Arbitrntion Association.

(n)

0

1

(b)
Arbitration. lf lhe parties fail in their auempt to resolve a dispute by
mediation: they will s1.,bmit the dispute to arbitration according to the then prevailing rules aod
procedures of the Ametican Arbitration Association. Utah· 1a·w will govern the rights a11Cl
c,bligat.ioo~ of the parties with respect to the matte.rs in controversy. Tbe arb1trator \Vill allocate.
all cosls and fees attributable to the arbitration be.tween the pru:ties e.qually. The arbitrator~s
award will be final and binding and judgment may be entered in any c.otlrt of competent
jt1risdic.tion.

8.6
~otices. Any notice contemplated. by this Agreement may be senl by any
commeTcially reasonable means~ including band delivery: first class mail. facsimile: e-mail or
private courier. The notice must be prepaid and addressed as set forth in the Company's records.
The notice wil] be effective on the date of receipt or, in the case of not1ce sent by firsc cl.ass mail:
che ti.frh clay afrnr mailing. If notice js required to b~ given to a Men1ber or Manager: a "vritten
"vaiver signed by the Member or ?\1fanager and delivered to the Company., whether before or after
the lime the notice is required to be given .. is the equivalent of timely nolic.e.

8.7
Resolution of foconsistencics.
If there are inc.onsistcnc.ies bet\.veen thi.s
Agreement and the Articles, the Articles will control. If there are inconsistencies between this
Agreement and the Act, this Agreement will control: except to the extent the inconsistem.:ie$
rebte to provisions of the Act that the Members cannot alkr by agreement. Without limiring the
generality of the foregoing: unless the language or context clearly indkate.s a different inlent, the
provisioos ol"this Agreement pertaining to the Company's governance and financial affairs and
the rights of the t\11embers upon witi1drawal aL1d dissolution will super!:>ede the provisions of the
Act relating to the same matters.
8.8
Additional Instruments. Each Metnber '"'·ill execute and deliver any docurnen't
or statement necessary tO give effect to the lenns of this Agreemefft or to comply with any ltnv~
rule or regulation governing the Company:.s fom1ation and ac.tivitics.
8.9 ·

Compntation of Time. In computing any period of time under this Agreernt!nt:.

che day of the.act or event from which the specified period begins to run is llOl included. The last
d,1y of tJ,e period. is included: unless it LS a Saturday~ Sunday ot legal hol1day, in vvh.ich case the
period wUI nm until the end of the next day that is llOl a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.
8.10 Ent.ire Agreement. This Agreement and the Artic.les comprise the en.tire
agreement among th~ pal1ies with respect to the Compnny. This Agreement and the Articles
supersede any prior agreements or understandings ,vith respect to the Company.
No .
represemation, statement or condition not contained in this Agreement or the Articles has nny
force or effect.
·
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8.11
Wniver. No right under this Agreement may be wa:ived~ except by an instrument
in writing signed by the party sought to be charged with the waiver.
8 .12 General Construction Principles. Words in any gender are deemed tu indude
Lhe other gender.s. The singular is deemed to include the plural and vice ve-rsa. The headings and
underlined. paragraph titles are for guidance only and have no significance in the interpretation of
chis Agreement.
8.13 Binding Effect. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement relating to Lhe
transfcrnbi lity of Membership Interests and the rights or Transft:rees~ th1s Agreement is binding
on and will inure to the benefil of the Cornpany, the Members and their respective distributees~
successors and ass·igns.

8.14 Governing Lnw. Utah lavv· governs the cons·truction and application of the tem1s
of th is .Agreement.
~Ll 5 Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of which
will be considered an orLginal.
Signed nn the re5pective dates set forth belowJ to he effective as of the Effective Date..

YIEMBERS:

in

Date:_

L. Hansen, Individually
t /-,

,- I

/oy

The undersigned as the Companfs designated initial Managtr~ accepts the oUke of
manager and agrees co be bound by aJ.l of the tem1s and t-onditions of this Agreement.
1

Signed on the dale sel fortb below, to be efl:ec.tivc as of the Effective Date.
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(j)

0

MANAGER:

,,,.,---·

Carolyn S. Hansen
Date:

l'> I •\)] •oS
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A~VIENDMENt TO TtIE OPERATING AGRE_EMENT
G)

OF

. VC HOLDINGS, LLC
This AMENDMENT, is among CAROLYN S. HANSEN, an individual of St. George,
Utah; VAUGHN L. HANSEN individual of St. George,· Utah, holding 100% of the . ·
outstanding Membership Interest in said entity.

~

RECITALS
The parties are all of the current Members of VC HOLDINGS, LLC, a Utah lim!ted
11
liabiliiy company {fhe Company") ... The parties intend by this Agreement to formalize
the current Membership in the Company.
· NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the Recitals set forth above, as well as other
good and valuable consideration, the Members· each execute· this Amendment for the
purposes set fo1ih herein.
.

AGREEMENT
The parties wish to amend provision 5.1 of the Operating Agreement

t~ read as follows:

ARTICLE 5: MANAGEMENT
5.1
Representative Management. The Company will be managed by
Managers. The Members from time to time may establish and change the number of
. Managers. The name and business address of the Company's initial Managers are
ca·rolyn S. lj.anseI1i P.O. Box 2183, St. George,· Utah 84771 and Vaughn L. Hansen,
P.O. Box 2183, St. George, Utah 84771.

~.

All other Articles are restated and republished as they appear in the Operating
~

Agreement of VC HOLDINGS, LLC, and remain unaffected by this Amendment unless
specifically altered or contradicted herein.

This Amendment is hereby effective as of June

1,,g

1

2007.

GHN L. HANSEN
j

,,
I

\
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S1..1:;;MBOSKI & ASSOClATES
ATrORNl:'.'i'S AT 1-AW

32

I (10 South. Suire 203
Post OITiL·e B,-.x 1717

l~;;ISI

Sl. Get"w~e. Ulnh 84 771
(4;"\5) 6::?X.-1435

FAX (4i5l 628- 1489
_jsle111bnsl..:i c~>$kn1hn:,;I, i-1~\w.com

JAMES E. SU:.IVIROSl<I. l>.C.

December 21 . ·20 I0

Vnughn L. and Carolyn S. Hansen
Managers or VC lTolding,s. LLC
P.O. Box 2183

St. Gcorc.c.
.... Utah R4 77 I
Dear Mr. ilnd Mrs. l·-Ianscn.
Chad and f Joma Eskelsen hereby inform you Lhat they arc proposing to
cx~rc.isc their rigl1ts under paragraph 9 of the Limited Liability Company Mcmbcr~hip
lntcrc!:it" Pledge Agreement you executed on May 5. 2009, by accepting your total issued
and outstanding membership interests in VC 1 loldings .. LLC. a Utah T..,·imitcd Liability
Company. in rull snlisfadio11 of your obligation to then~. Consequently, lhey will be the
sole members or VC Holdings~ LLC and. in accordance with their righl8 as members~ will ·
remove you as members nnd managers of l.hc snmc.

Ci

As you arc aware. you arc in dcfoult of your oblignlions under the
Promis8nry Note associated with th~ Pledge Agreement. Specifically. you have nol made
monthly principal and interest: payment<:; as prom1sed. Paragraph 9 of the Pledge
Agreement. states:
If :my Event of Dc:fault ~hall have occurred and be continuing: (a) All
rights nf Plcdgor [Hanscns] lo exercise t.hc voting and other con~rnsu:d
rights that Plcdgor ,:\,ould otherwise be cntil"Jed to exercise ... and to
receive the distributions and proceeds thal. Pledgor would otherwise be
authorized to receive and n:~tt,in ... shall~ at the option of Secured Party
IT~skelsensJ ... thereupon become vested in Secured Party. who shall
thereupon have the sole right ln exercise such voting und olhcr consensual
rights and lo receive and hnld a!{ colhHcrnL nr apply against any unpaid
obi igat.ion:,; .... Pledger hereby consents to, and approves'\ the admi~sion
nf Secured Pnrty as a member of l'hc Company ....

Pur~uant lo the Pledge Agreement, lhe Eskclscns arc hereby exercising their option to he
aclmill.ed as members nf VC 1:-1.oldings nnd agsume the rights an.cl obligatif't11s nsso.a,•···•P~LA~INT!!l~F!!!!F,!IS•._
i
EXHIBIT
1
11
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lhcre,\1 ith. Speci.lic.ally. Lh(; Eskelsens are entilled to rece.ivc directly. and retain. nny
dividends or cnsh distrjbutinns paid or disl.ribut:cd in respect of their mcmhcr interests.
Fltrthcr. as the sole.~ members nfVC Holdings, and pursuant to lJl"ah Code
/\nnnt.at<.;d ~ 18-2--c.:-804(6)(c) and paragn1ph 5.1 O(c) or t.hc Operating Agreement of VC
Holdings
of VC r-lolchngs.
,._ .. I ,LC, the Eskclsens are removing you as managers
._
1

'-

"-

Thank you for your time and consideralion of this maller. IJ you object to
the Eskclscns· proposal l.o accept your member interest in fuJl satisfncLion nr your
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AddendumD
Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act (repealed 2013)
Utah Code§ 48-lc-104. Separate legal entity.
A company formed under this chapter is a legal entity distinct from its members.
Utah Code § 48-lc-502. General rules for operating agreements.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection 48-2c-120(1), or in the articles of organization, an
operating agreement may modify the rules of any provision of this chapter that relates to:
(a) the management of the company;
(b) the business or purpose of the company;
(c) the conduct of the company's affairs; or
(d) the rights, duties, powers, and qualifications of, and relations between and among,
the members, the managers, the members' assignees and transferees, and the
company.
(2) Where the provisions of an operating agreement conflict with the provisions of this
chapter, the provisions of this chapter shall control. Where the provisions of an operating
agreement conflict with the articles of organization, the articles of organization shall control
except to the extent the articles of organization conflict with the provisions of this chapter.
Utah Code§ 48-2c-701. Nature of member interest.
(1) A member's interest in a company is personal property regardless of the nature of the
property owned by the company.
(2) A member has no interest in specific property of a company.

@

Utah Code § 48-2c-704. Meetings of members.
Unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating agreement, no meetings
need be held for actions taken by members. If meetings of members are allowed or required
under the articles of organization or operating agreement, then, unless otherwise provided in the
articles of organization or operating agreement:
(1) a meeting of members may be called by any manager in a manager-managed
company or by members in any company holding at least 25% interest in profits of the company;
(2) any business may be transacted at any meeting of members which is properly called;
(3) notice of a meeting of members must be given to each member at least five days prior
to the meeting and shall give the date, place, and time of the meeting;
(4) notice of a meeting of members may be given orally or in writing or by electronic
means;
(5) the person calling the meeting may designate any place within or without the state as
the place for the meeting. If no place is designated, the place of the meeting shall be the principal
office of the company or, if there is no principal office in this state, in Salt Lake County;
(6) only persons who are members of record at the time notice of a meeting is given shall
be entitled to notice or to vote at the meeting, except that a fiduciary, such as a trustee, personal
representative, or guardian, shall be entitled to act in such capacity on behalf of a member of
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record if evidence of such status is presented to the company and except that a surviving joint
tenant shall be entitled to receive notice and act where evidence of the other joint tenant's death
is presented to the company;
(7) a quorum must be present in person or by proxy at a meeting of members for any
business to be transacted and a quorum shall consist of members holding at least 51 % interest in
profits of the company;
(8) the members present at any meeting at which a quorum is present may continue to
transact business notwithstanding the withdrawal of members from the meeting in such numbers
that less than a quorum remains;
(9) a member may participate in and be considered present at a meeting by, or the
meeting may be conducted through the use of, any means of communication by which all
persons participating in the meeting may hear each other, or otherwise communicate with each
other during the meeting;
(10) voting at a meeting shall be determined by percentage interests in the profits of the
company; and
(11) a proxy, to be effective, must be in writing and signed by the member and must be
filed with the secretary of the meeting before or at the time of the meeting and shall be valid for
no more than 11 months after it was signed unless otherwise provided in the proxy.
Utah Code § 48-2c-706. Action by members without a meeting.
(1) Unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating agreement, and
subject to the limitations of Subsection (5), any action which may be taken by the members may
be taken without any meeting and without prior notice, if one or more consents in writing, setting
forth the action so taken, shall be signed by the members holding interests in the company not
less than the minimum percentage that would be necessary to authorize or take that action.
(2) (a) Unless the written consents of all members entitled to vote have been obtained,
notice of any member approval without a meeting shall be given at least five days before the
consummation of the transaction, action, or event authorized by the member action to those
entitled to vote who have not consented in writing.
(b) The notice must contain or be accompanied by a description of the transaction, action,
or event.
(3) Provided the notice described in Subsection (2) is given, action taken by the members
pursuant to this section is effective as of the date the last written consent necessary to authorize
or take the action is received by the company, unless all of the written consents specify a later
date as the effective date of the action, in which case the later date shall be the effective date of
the action. If the company has received written consents as contemplated by Subsection (1),
signed by all members entitled to vote with respect to the action, the effective date of the action
may be any date that is specified in all of the written consents.
(4) Unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement, any consent or writing may be
received by the company by any electronically transmitted or other form of communication that
provides the company with a complete copy thereof, including the signature thereto.
(5) Any member or an authorized representative of that member may revoke a consent by
a signed writing describing the action and stating that the member's prior consent is revoked, if
the writing is received by the company prior to the effective date and time of the action.
2
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(6) A member action taken pursuant to this section is not effective unless all written
consents on which the company relies for taking an action pursuant to Subsection (1) are
received by the company within a 60-day period and not revoked pursuant to Subsection (5).
(7) Written consent of the members entitled to vote constitutes approval of the members
and may be described as such in any document.

Utah Code § 48-2c-802(2), (3). Agency authority of members and managers.

***
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(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), in a manager-managed company:
(a) each manager is an agent of the company for the purpose of its business;
(b) a member is not an agent of the company for the purpose of its business solely by
reason of being a member;
(c) an act of a manager, including the signing of a document in the company name,
for apparently carrying on in the ordinary course of the company business, or business of the
kind carried on by the company, binds the company unless the manager had no authority to act
for the company in the particular matter and the lack of authority was expressly described in the
articles of organization or the person with whom the manager was dealing knew or otherwise had
notice that the manager lacked authority; and
(d) an act of a manager which is not apparently for carrying on in the ordinary course
of the company business, or business of the kind carried on by the company, binds the company
only if the act was authorized by the members in accordance with Subsection 48-2c-803(2) or
(3).
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsections (1) and (2), unless the articles of
organization expressly limit their authority, any member in a member-managed company, or any
manager in a manager-managed company, may sign, acknowledge, and deliver any document
transferring or affecting the company's interest in real or personal property, and if the authority
is not so limited, the document shall be conclusive in favor of a person who gives value without
knowledge of the lack of authority of the person who signs and delivers the document.

Utah Code§ 48-2c-804. Management by managers.
In a manager-managed company, each manager and each member shall be subject to Section 482c-807 and:
(1) (a) the initial managers shall be designated in the articles of organization; and
(b) after the initial managers, the managers shall be those persons identified in documents
filed with the division including:
(i) amendments to the articles of organization;
(ii) the annual reports required under Section 48-2c-203; and
(iii) the statements required or permitted under Section 48-2c-122;
(2) when there is a change in the management structure from a member-managed
company to a manager-managed company, the managers shall be those persons identified in the
certificate of amendment to the articles of organization that makes the change;
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(3) each manager who is a natural person must have attained the age of majority under
the laws of this state;
(4) no manager shall have authority to do any act in contravention of the articles of
organization or the operating agreement, except as provided in Subsection (6)(g);
( 5) a manager who is also a member shall have all of the rights of a member;
(6) unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization or operating agreement of the
company:
(a) except for the initial managers, each manager shall be elected at any time by
the members holding at least a majority of the profits interests in the company, and any vacancy
occurring in the position of manager shall be filled in the same manner;
(b) the number of managers:
(i) shall be fixed by the members in the operating agreement; or
(ii) shall be the number designated by members holding at least a majority of
the profits interests in the company if the operating agreement fails to
designate the number of managers;
(c) each manager shall serve until the earliest to occur of:
(i) the manager's death, withdrawal, or removal;
(ii) an event described in Subsection 48-2c-708(1 )(f); or
(iii) if membership in the company is a condition to being a manager, an event
described in Subsection 48-2c-708(1 )(d) or (e);
(d) a manager need not be a member of the company or a resident of this state;
(e) any manager may be removed with or without cause by the members, at any
time, by the decision of members owning a majority of the profits interests in the company;
(f) there shall be only one class of managers; and
(g) approval by:
(i) all of the members and all of the managers shall be required for matters
described in Subsection 48-2c-803(2); and
(ii) members holding 2/3 of the profits interests in the company, and 2/3 of
the managers shall be required for all matters described in Subsection 482c-803(3 ).
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Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act
Utah Code§ 25-6-2. Definitions.
In this chapter:
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not include:
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not
subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured.
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim.
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim.
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim.

Ci

Utah Code§ 25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer -- Claim arising before or after transfer.
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor,
whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was
incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or
obligation; and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for
which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in
relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he
would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due.
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (1 )(a), consideration may be given,
among other factors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the
transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been
sued or threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(t) the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably
equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation
incurred;
5
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(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was
made or the obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was
incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who
transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.

Utah Code§ 25-6-9. Good faith transfer.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a transfer or obligation is not voidable
under Subsection 25-6-S(l)(a) against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably
equivalent value or against any subsequent transferee or obligee.

***
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